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ABSTRACT 
HEGEL ON RELIGION AND STATE 
 
EDA HAYRİOĞULLARI 
Political Science MA Thesis, 2010 
Assistant Prof. Dr. Nedim Nomer 
 
Keywords: Hegel, Early Hegel, religion, Christianity, state, secularity, separation of 
religion and state 
 
 
This thesis analyzes the relation between religion and state in G. W. F. Hegel’s thought. 
There is an agreement in Hegel literature that Hegel affirms both separability and 
inseperability of religion and state. This seemingly contradictory affirmation constitutes 
the main problematic which this work attempts to provide a clarified solution. To 
understand the true nature of the problem, Hegel’s Early Theological Writings has been 
analyzed first. In these works, Hegel identifies the basic principle of Christianity to be 
freedom but takes state as a coercive institution. To overcome this opposition which is 
also alienating, Hegel later posits a theory of modern state which is based on freedom.  
Indeed, this thesis argues that including the earliest writings on religion, Hegel has 
always argued for separation of religion and state at institutional level, but objected to 
their opposite conceptions in his later thought. Hegel attempts to resolve this opposition 
by positing unity of religion and state at historical and metaphysical levels. Historically, 
modern state is realization of freedom which emerges first in Christianity and shares the 
same content of truth and same principle of freedom with religion at metaphysical level 
but has a different form of expression. For Hegel, not their unity of content but different 
forms should be institutionalized as a political principle. In conclusion, Hegel’s state is 
secular at institutional level but at the level of thought, his understanding of secularity, 
by providing a common basis to state/religion, reason/faith antitheses, is distinguished 
from Enlightenment which can not overcome these dichotomies. 
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ÖZET 
HEGEL FELESEFESİNDE DİN VE DEVLET 
 
EDA HAYRİOĞULLARI 
Siyaset Bilimi, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2010 
Yard. Doç. Dr. Nedim Nomer 
 
Anahtar Sözcükler: Hegel, Erken Hegel, Hıristiyanlık, din, devlet, laiklik, din ve devlet 
işlerinin ayrılması 
 
Bu tez G. W. F. Hegel’in din ve devlet ilişkisiyle ilgili görüşlerini inceler. Hegel üzerine 
yazılmış kaynaklarda, Hegel’in hem din ve devletin ayrılabilirliğini ve hem de 
ayrılamazlığını ileri sürdüğü üzerine bir fikir birliği sağlandığı görülmektedir. Hegel’in 
görünürde bir çelişki olarak ortaya çıkan konu üzerindeki bu tutumu, bu çalışmanın 
aydınlığa kovuşturacak bir çözüm önerme girişiminde olduğu, temel sorunsalını 
oluşturur. Problemin gerçek doğasını kavramak için, öncelikle Hegel’in Erken Teolojik 
Yazıları incelenmiştir. Bu eserlerde Hegel Hıristiyanlığın temel prensibini özgürlük 
olarak belirlerken, devleti temel olarak baskıcı ve zora dayalı bir kurum olarak ele alır. 
Hegel, geç döneminde aynı zamanda yabancılaştırıcı da olan din ve devlet arasındaki bu 
karşıtlığı aşmak için, özgürlüğe dayalı bir modern devlet fikri ortaya atar. Bu tez, 
Hegel’in din üzerine yazdığı en erken eserlerinden itibaren, din ve devletin kurumsal 
kademede hep ayrılması gerektiğini fakat geç dönem düşüncesinde bu ayrılığın bir 
karşıtlık olarak düşünülmemesi gerektiğini savunduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Hegel bu 
karşıtlığı tarihsel ve metafizik kademelerde din ve devlet arası bir birlik ortaya atarak 
çözmeye çalışır. Hegel’e göre modern devlet; tarihsel olarak, öncelikle Hıristiyanlıkta 
ortaya çıkan özgürlük prensibinin gerçeklemesidir. Dinle soyut-metafizik bir düzeyde 
aynı doğruluk içeriğine ve özgürlük prensibine sahip olmasına rağmen,  Hegel’in 
modern devleti bu ortak içeriğin dinden farklı bir biçimsel ifadesidir. Hegel, din ve 
devlet arasındaki içeriksel birliğin değil, biçimsel farklılığın, politik bir prensip olarak 
kurumsallaşması gerektiğini savunur. Sonuçta, Hegel’in devleti kurumsal düzeyde laik 
bir devlettir fakat düşünce düzeyinde Hegel’in laiklik anlayışı din/devlet, akıl/inanç 
ikililiklerini aşamayan Aydınlanma düşüncesinden, bu ikililiklere ortak bir zemin 
sağlamasıyla kendini ayırır. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
INTRODUCTION 
 This thesis is an attempt of analyzing the complex relation between religion and 
state in Hegel’s thought and is motivated by George Kelly’s assertion which suggests 
that Hegel’s discussion of religion and state “encapsulates much of what is most 
distinctive in Hegel's political philosophical outlook.’’1  
To start, there seems to be an agreement in the literature that Hegel affirms both 
separation of religion and state and inseparability of both somehow. Indeed, Paul 
Franco suggests that; 
Hegel’s attitude is typically complex. On the one hand, he rejects the 
Enlightenment liberal idea that church and state should be kept strictly separate. 
On the other hand he wants nothing to do with theocracy.2  
 
Similarly Timothy Luther, in his Hegel’s Critique of Modernity. Reconciling Individual 
Freedom and Community points to the same complexity in Hegel’s philosophy and 
argues that while advocating a certain unity with religion and state; Hegel also 
recognizes the need for separation between religion and state.3 Moreover according to 
Walter Jaeschke, Hegel’s ideal solution to the problematic relation between religion and 
state is not a theocratic and ultimately a religious state. But says Jaeschke, it equally 
stands in contrast to emancipation of autonomous ethical life and rational law from 
religion.4 Furthermore Peter Hodgson approves other authors by asserting that Hegel’s 
                                               
1 in Paul Franco, , Hegel's Philosophy of Freedom (Yale University Press: New Heaven 
and London, 1999), p. 296 
 
2 Ibid, p.296 
 
3 Timothy Luther, Hegel’s Critique of Modernity. Reconciling Individual Freedom and 
Community (Lexington Books: Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, 
UK, 2009), p. 221 
 
 
4 Walter Jaeschke, “Christianity and Secularity in Hegel's Concept of the State,’’ The 
Journal of Religion, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Apr., 1981), p. 141 
 2 
state is neither theocratic and nor secularist.  According to Hodgson, Hegel’s vision of 
state-religion relationship can not be constructed as in Protestant England in which 
laws, governmental authority and political constitution derive from God since under this 
condition; there is no adequate means for preventing the abuses that would result from 
the conjunction of religious and political power. It is equally not possible to take France 
as model in which religion and state have different laws and stand in opposition to each 
other. American model in a similar vain, can not constitute an adequate example of 
Hegel’s vision in which state and religion have been separated but principle of state is 
not traced back to its ultimate ground; God.  For Hodgson, there should be found a form 
of polity that adequately institutionalizes Hegel’s vision of state-religion relationship 
but Hegel himself does not offer such an alternative.5  Moreover Merold Westphall 
suggests that affirming both separability and inseparability of religion is both the genius 
of Hegel and constitutes one of his greatest difficulties. According to Westphal, it is 
important to keep in mind that Hegel has no problem about holding these views 
simultaneously. 6 This work affirms that Hegel holds both of these views but at different 
levels.  
       To understand, how these contradictory attitudes could be held together, staring 
point will be his earlier writings on religion. This thesis searches for the central problem 
of Hegel in these so called Theological Writings in Chapter 2. The result of the analysis 
is that Christianity as the religion of freedom, either in the form of moral autonomy or 
in the spirit of reconciliation, could not realize its emancipating potential. It either 
degenerated into an oppressive church or remained alienated from the actual world of 
politics by positing a Kingdom of God beyond. The real problem of Hegel is alienating 
aspects of Christianity. This is the opposite of his ideal folk religion which can unite 
people to public and social life and reconcile them. Second motif and which is at the 
very root of alienation problem is the opposition of legal/political sphere and religion.  
This thesis claims that including his very early writings, Hegel has always supported 
separation of religion and state but objected to their opposition which is alienating. In 
his early period, Hegel seems to adopt an understanding of state which is primarily 
                                                                                                                                         
 
5 Peter C. Hodgston, Hegel and Christian Theology. A Reading of the Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Religion (Oxford University Pres: Oxford, New York, 2005), p. 196 - 197  
 
6 Westphal Merold, Hegel, Freedom, and Modernity ((State University of New York 
Press: Albany, 1992), p. 173 
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coercive and based on force and a view of Christianity which has freedom as its basis. 
For overcoming this antithesis, Hegel in his later period will adopt a theory of state 
which is based on freedom. The emergence of this modern state constitutes the topic of 
the third chapter. 
In the Chapter 3, Hegel’s understanding of history is assessed first since modern 
state has been posited as the goal of history. It is argued that Hegel’s history can be read 
either as only a human history towards more progress and rationality, or as the arena of 
the realization of divine providence. His easy switch between religious and secular 
discourses has been emphasized as the focal point. This attempt of Hegel distinguishes 
him from the Enlightenment, if read as a project of reconciliation of religion with 
modernity.  Second attempt in the third chapter is explaining Hegel’s understanding of 
history as the realization of Christian principle of freedom. His post reformation idea of 
modern state is based on Christian principle. This might be understood as Christianity 
historically gave rise to modern state and so fulfilled its historical function. The 
dialectic in his Lectures on Philosophy of Religion which ends in establishment of 
Ethical Life (Sittlichkeit) as a form of cult, and a very limited reference to Christianity 
in Philosophy of Right seems to validate this argument. However, this assumption is 
rejected by Hegel, himself. Furthermore, two other common grounds of religion and 
state has been labeled in Hegel’s thought and argued for that these arguments in no way 
gave rise to religious fundamentalism or any kind of theocratic form of polity. One such 
argument depends on his specific understanding of Volksgeist (Spirit of People), shaped 
primarily by religious conviction of people.  It has been claimed by Hegel that religious 
conviction of people shapes their polity. Protestant conviction gave rise to an 
understanding of divine earthly realm and most remarkably a divine conception of state 
for Hegel. Hard and soft readings of this assertion have been debated. Second unity of 
religion and state has been found in Hegel’s conception of truth. By positing that both 
religion and state are embodiments of truth, it is argued that Hegel establishes an 
identity between religion and state at metaphysical level. Moreover, by claiming that all 
religions have the same truth in their content; Hegel similarly recognizes a type of unity 
among all religions but distinguishes them according to their forms. The pluralist 
implications of this assertion have been discussed. The chapter concludes by suggesting 
that it is not the metaphysical unity but formal distinction between religion and state is 
to be institutionalized.  
 Fourth chapter first intends to show that none of the institution of Hegel’s system 
of Right is shaped by religious dogma. The moments of the System of Right namely; 
 4 
abstract right, morality, ethical life (family, civil society and state) are not established 
according to Christian teaching. Moreover except the long remark of paragraph 270, 
there is almost no mention of religion in Philosophy of Right. Individual appears as a 
right bearer, moral subject, burgher and citizen but not as believer.  Secondly, 
separation of church and state is discussed in the chapter. It has been reaffirmed that 
Hegel supports an institutional separation. But at historical and metaphysical levels 
Hegel tries to synthesize dichotomies of faith/reason, secular/Christian and 
state/religion. 
In the concluding chapter, main points and arguments of the thesis have been 
reconsidered and its further implications have been stated. The chapter ends with a 
discussion on Hegel’s position with reference to Enlightenment. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
LEGALITY AND RELIGION IN EARLY HEGEL 
Herman Nohl, edited some earlier manuscripts of Hegel, discovered after his death, 
which predates his Jena period, and published them under the title Hegels theologische 
Jugendschriften in 1907.7 English translation of these earlier manuscripts by Richard 
Knox appears in 1948 as Early Theological Writings. Starting from the title of these 
manuscripts which Nohl chose to publish under, the character of these early works and 
Hegel’s attitude towards Christianity is highly debated. Some scholars8 argued that the 
title of work is misleading, these earlier manuscripts of Hegel, written during 1793 – 
1800, have nothing to do with theology. Hegel’s treatment of religion is historical; he 
focuses on political, economic, social aspects of religious phenomenon. More than 
theologian, Hegel’s attitude is that of an anthropologist of religion. On the other hand, 
stands the opponents’ idea which claims that, although Hegel criticizes the current 
theology of his time, these works are not anti – theological9 or they at least belong to the 
field of political theology.10 Although it is not the central problem of this thesis, 
whether these earlier manuscripts are theological or anti theological, this work 
implicitly supports the view that Hegel’s early writings on Christianity can not be 
                                               
7 On Christianity: Early Theological Writings (trans) T. M. Knox ( Harper Torchbooks: 
New York, 1961)  p. v 
 
8 Please see Walter A. Kaufmann “Hegel’s Early Antitheological Phase, ’’ The 
Philosophical Review, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Jan., 1954), pp. 3, 12.  Georg Lukács, The Young 
Hegel. Studies in the Relationship Between Dialectics and Economics. (trans) Rodney 
Livingstone (Merlin Press: London, 1975),p. 64 . Sholomo Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of 
the Modern State (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1972), p. 13 
 
9 Raymond Keith Williamson, Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of Religion (State 
University of New York Press: Albany, 1984), p. 9 
 
10 William Desmond, Hegel’s God, A Counterfeit Double? (Ashgate: England, USA, 
2003), p.32 
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subsumed under theology. Hegel’s treatment of the subject is both historical and 
philosophical. Moreover, one who has some acquaintance with the abstract, obscure 
terminology of Hegel’s later works will be surprised with the concrete analysis 
employed in these works.  
         Secondly, there is also the debate whether these works are anti Christian11  in its 
promise or part of a project of reconsidering and reconstructing the Christian religion 
which will serve as a basis for his consideration of modern society.12 This thesis 
approves that Hegel is critical of religion but this criticism does not end in total 
rejection of Christianity. On the contrary, Hegel characterizes early Christianity as a 
religion of freedom in its inception. But, his analysis of the history of Christianity 
shows that this liberating potential of Christianity is not realized, Christian religion 
becomes an oppressive force under Roman Catholic Church. Moreover he also argues 
that since the time of Jesus, Christianity is alienated and alienating from actual world of 
politics.  Therefore, alienation is also a Christian problem. To solve this problem, Hegel 
will later posit a theory of modern state which is founded on freedom and thus which 
accords with his understanding of Christianity as the religion of freedom.  The role of 
this religion of freedom in his later understanding of state will be discussed in the fourth 
chapter of this thesis. In this chapter, I will put emphasize on Hegel’s distinction 
between legal sphere and religion which stand in opposition to one another in his early 
writings. I will try to show that although Hegel supports the separation of church and 
state, but he considers it as a problem that separated components are also opposed to 
each other. His folk-religion, modeled on ancient Greece, reflects his search for a 
harmonious and integrated relation of religion and legal institutions in a free society. 
 
 
 
                                               
 
11  Following works interpret Early Hegel as anti-Christian. See Walter A. Kaufmann 
“Hegel’s Early Antitheological Phase, ’’ The Philosophical Review, Vol. 63, No. 1 
(Jan., 1954), pp. 3, 12.  Georg Lukács, The Young Hegel. Studies in the Relationship 
Between Dialectics and Economics. (trans) Rodney Livingstone (Merlin Press: London, 
1975), p. 68. Robert C Solomon, In the Spirit of Hegel. A Study of G.W.F. Hegel's 
Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford University Press: Oxford New York, 1983), p. 587 
 
12  Variances of this line of argument are found for example in: Charles Taylor,  Hegel 
(Cambridge University Pres: New York, 1977). Raymond Plant, Hegel (Routledge: 
New York, 1999). Laurence Dickey, Hegel. Religion, Economics, and the Politics of 
Spirit (Cambridge University Pres: Cambridge, New York, 1987) 
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         2. 1 Folk Religion 
        In his so called Tübingen Essay written in 1793, stayed unpublished during his 
life-time, Hegel occupies himself in developing a certain understanding of religion 
which he defines as folk- religion (Volksreligion). Analyzing this essay is crucial for a 
study that engages in explaining the complex relationship between religion and 
political-social arrangements in Hegel’s thought. Indeed, the concept of folk religion is 
significant primarily because it reflects the centrality of religion in Hegel’s thought. 
Secondly, the essay shows Hegel’s critical attitude towards Enlightenment 
understanding of religion which he associates with Kant’s conception of religion within 
the limits of reason alone. Thirdly, it is his fist attempt in defining the role of religion 
in collective life of people. 
To start, Tübingen Essay is rich in analytics of religion. He defines certain ideal 
types of religion including subjective, objective, public, private, folk, pure rational, 
positive religions together with fetish faith and superstition. For, the central interest of 
this section is folk-religion; all these types are not of equal significance. However, 
since the analysis of subjective/objective dichotomy is constructive for the meaning of 
folk-religion, it will be the starting point of this analysis.  
Objective religion is abstract theology in which understanding and memory are 
operative powers.13 It is the religion which is arranged in one’s own mind and organized 
into a system, expressed in a book and communicated in discourse. It is the religion, 
says Hegel, that “we are taught at school from youth up.’’14 Subjective religion on the 
other hand, is not the religion of knowledge but of feeling and action. Subjective 
religion is fully individuated religion which affects individual’s feeling and is an active 
force in his outward behavior.15 Hegel remarks that his distinction is similar to the 
distinction suggested by Fichte in the Kritik aller Offenbarung between theology and 
religion.16  
                                               
13 G. W. F. Hegel, Unter objektiver Religion (The Berne Plan of 1794) in Harris H. S., 
Hegel’s Development Toward the Sunlight 1770 – 1801 (Oxford University Press: New 
York, 1972), p.  508 
 
14 G. W. F.  Hegel, Religion ist eine [The Tübingen Essay of 1793] in Hegel’s 
Development Toward the Sunlight 1770 – 1801 (trans) H. S. Harris (Oxford University 
Press: New York, 1972), p. 485  
 
15 Ibid. p. 484 
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 Distinguishing between objective and subjective religion, Hegel gives his preference to 
subjective religion over objective one. He notes that; 
         Everything depends on subjective religion – it is this that has 
true and genuine worth – let the theologians content about the 
dogmas, about all that belongs to objective religion; about 
more precise interpretations of the propositions;…..When I 
speak of religion  here, I abstract absolutely from all scientific 
or, more precisely, metaphysical knowledge of God, and of 
our relation to him, or that of the whole world, etc. evidence of 
this sort, with which only the discursive understanding is 
concerned, is theology not religion any longer. I include here 
under religion only such knowledge of God and immortality as 
the need of practical reason demands, and all that in the easily 
perceived connection with it - Those more precise deductions 
about special arrangements of God for the benefit of man are 
not excluded. With the objective religion I am concerned only 
in as much as it constitutes one factor in subjective religion-17  
 
Thus, it can be said that for Hegel, religion is primarily a practical, down to earth 
matter, not an abstract endeavor of technical understanding. In an attempt of 
contextualizing this attitude of Hegel, Keith Williamson in his Introduction to Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Religion argues that Hegel’s experience of theology at Tübingen, which 
reduced Christianity to a matter of book learning, is responsible for his disdain for 
contemporary Christianity.18 More than this but, it would be more appropriate to 
approach this issue from Hegel’s critical engagement with Enlightenment which we can 
also provide textual support.  
Firstly, Hegel’s attitude towards religion differs significantly from French 
philosophes who consider religion in terms of superstition. Indeed, Hegel affirms that 
religion can become mere superstition when religion and fear of god becomes the 
motive for action in situations where mere prudence should be the guide.19 Genuine 
                                                                                                                                         
16 H. S. Harris, Hegel’s Development. Toward the Sunlight 1770 – 1801 (Oxford 
University Press: New York, 1972) p. 129 
 
 
17 G. W. F.  Hegel, Religion ist eine [The Tübingen Essay of 1793] in Hegel’s 
Development. Toward the Sunlight 1770 – 1801 (trans) H. S. Harris (Oxford University 
Press: New York, 1972), pp. 485 -486 
 
18 Raymond K. Williamson, Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of Religion (State 
University of New York Press: Albany, 1984), p. 13 
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religion on the other hand, must be grounded on reason but this is not enough for 
Hegel.20 In his attempt of transcending religion of reason, he also distinguishes himself 
from Kant and Lessing. It is true that he appreciates the works of Enlightenment and 
mentions Lessing’s Nathan as the noble example of them. However enlightenment’s 
understanding of religion has a defect and this is its lack of practicability.  Basically, 
enlightenment is the intent to work through understanding. But, in clarifying and 
purifying its principles it only serves objective religion.21 It is not a force of action and 
can not influence our lives. In other words, it can not guarantee that its moral principles 
will be active in life. Similar to Rousseau, he argues that Enlightenment “makes us 
cleverer but not better.’’22 Furthermore, if our purpose is to establish human society, 
there must be universal principles which are not only valid for common sense but also 
constitute the foundation of every genuine religion. There are few such principles, but 
they are so general and abstract that they do not correspond to experience and can not 
be adapted to the living condition of the people easily. Therefore it is impossible to 
constitute a religion out of universal principle for the general populace. Beside reason, 
additional elements which appeal to sensible and empirical side of man must be 
introduced. Apart from Kant’s pure respect for the law, man needs other motives which 
affect his sensibility.23 Sensibility arose in tendencies among which he mentions 
compassion, benevolence and friendship.24 Therefore, fundamental principle of man’s 
empirical character is love and love has a common point with reason. In fact, just as 
reason acknowledges the principles of universally valid laws recognizes itself as a 
                                                                                                                                         
19 G. W. F.  Hegel, Religion ist eine [The Tübingen Essay of 1793] in Hegel’s 
Development. Toward the Sunlight 1770 – 1801 (trans) H. S. Harris (Oxford University 
Press: New York, 1972), p. 487  
 
20 Ibid. p. 492 
 
21 Ibid. p.489 
 
22 Ibid. p. 490 
 
23 Ibid. pp. 491 - 492, 495 
 
24 D. Joshua, Goldstein Hegel’s Idea of the Good Life. From Virtue to Freedom, Early 
Writings and Mature Political Philosophy. Studies in German Idealism. Vol. 7 
(Springer: Netherlands, 2006), p. 2 
 10 
fellow citizen of an intelligible world and know itself in each rational being, love 
similarly finds itself in other men.25  
 
 In short, ideal religion for Hegel would be the one which is founded on reason 
and in that sense objective but transcend it by appealing to sensible side of man which 
he defines as compassion, benevolence and friendship and so has practical, subjective 
and public aspects as opposed to clerical  religion. This ideal religion is folk religion 
which Hegel characterizes as; 
 Its doctrines must be grounded on Universal Reason 
 Fancy, heart and sensibility must not thereby go empty away 
           It must be so constituted that all needs of life- the public affairs of the     
State are tied in with it.26 
              
With respect to the first feature of folk religion, Hegel adds that its doctrines, which are 
grounded on reason, must be simple and humane and also must not be alien to the 
spiritual culture of people.27 Secondly, these doctrines of religion should not interfere 
with civic justice or made the basis for a moral censorship in private life. Therefore, the 
power of the priests will be limited. There can be no room for separate ecclesiastical 
courts or any religious juridical institution. Moral censorship on the other hand which is 
detrimental to the natural growth of the personality and spontaneous expression of 
feelings is also wrong.28  
 On that account, it can be said that, Hegel distinguishes between legal, private spheres 
and folk religion. This point becomes more apparent when his division of public/private 
religion is considered. Indeed, he argues that forming the moral character of individual 
is the task of private religion together with parental training, personal effort and 
particular circumstances. On the other hand, folk-religion which itself is a type of public 
religion is concerned with forming the spirit of people, i. e. the task which folk religion 
                                               
 
25 G. W. F.  Hegel, Religion ist eine [ The Tübingen Essay of 1793] in Hegel’s 
Development. Toward the Sunlight 1770 – 1801 (trans) H. S. Harris (Oxford University 
Press: New York, 1972), p. 496 
 
26 Ibid. p. 499 
 
27 Ibid, p. 500 
 
28 H. S. Harris, Hegel’s Development. Toward the Sunlight 1770 – 1801 (Oxford 
University Press: New York, 1972), p. 147 
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shares with political institutions.29 Moreover, the development of individual in 
accordance with his character is assigned to private religion because there are various 
ways of developing character and in this experience, only individual can help him. 
Secondly virtue and comfort in suffering can only be provided by private religion; 
making them a matter of teaching and preaching produces just the opposite results.30 
This distinction of private/public religion echoes Rousseau’s distinction between 
religion of man and religion of citizen. Rousseau in Book VIII of his Social Contract 
defines this distinction in the following way; 
The first, without temples, without altars, without 
rites, limited to the purely internal worship of the supreme God and to 
the eternal duties of morality, is the pure and simple religion of the Gospel, 
the true theism, and what may be called the natural divine law. The other, 
inscribed in a single country, gives to it its gods, its peculiar and tutelary 
patrons. It has its dogmas, its rites, its external religion prescribed by the 
laws; outside the single nation which observes it, everything is for it infidel, 
foreign, and barbarous; it extends the duties and rights of men only as far as 
its altars. Such were all the religions of early peoples, to which may be 
given the name of divine law, civil or positive.31  
 
Although both Rousseau and Hegel distinguishes between private and public forms of 
religion, Hegel does not see public religion as a source for law, therefore keeps a 
autonomous sphere of legality.32 This point is further elaborated in his 1794 Berne Plan 
(Unter objektiver Religion). Accordingly, in that manuscript Hegel argues that public 
legal system has only legality as its purpose, not morality. No specific institutions are 
established for the fulfillment of respect for the moral law and of the disposition to 
fulfill the laws of spirit.  Morality is but the supreme purpose of man and religion, 
among other tendencies, is the most important one in contributing to this.33 Demarcation 
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32 Compare Joshua Goldstein argument in his Hegel’s Idea of Good Life (Springer: 
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of legality and religion, whose primary aspect is the nourishment of moral law, is the 
central motive of Hegel’s early writings which will reoccur constantly. However at this 
point it is crucial to ask that if the sphere of religion and legality are so clearly distinct 
how it would be possible to link folk-religion with all aspect of public life including  all 
the affairs of state (the third characteristic of folk religion). In fact, although these two 
spheres have their distinguished purposes, i. e. religion has morality as its purpose and 
legality is the aim of public legal sphere, Hegel argues that;  
The spirit of people, its history, its religion, the level of its 
political freedom - [these things] can not be treated separately 
either with respect to their mutual influence, or in characterizing 
them [each by itself]- they are woven together in a single 
bond…34  
 
Therefore, we can derive that Folk Religion is part of Volksgeist, (spirit of people) and 
they are in relation of mutual influence. Marcuse in Reason and Revolution compares 
Hegel’s use of Volksgeist to Montesquieu use of the spirit general of a nation. The 
national spirit is not a mystic metaphysical entity, but depicts all the natural, technical, 
economic, moral and intellectual conditions that shape nation’s historical 
development.35  
On the other hand, Folk-Religion goes in hand with political freedom because it 
generates and nourishes noble dispositions.36 Thus in their distinctive purposes, folk 
religion and legal system mutually influence each other because they are part of the 
higher unity defined as Volksgeist. The aim of folk religion is partly making up the 
morality of community. It can accomplish its task by making reason sensible and 
practicable and thus establishing a community of love and virtue. These noble 
dispositions of community are necessary to sustain a free constitution and thus 
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contribute to political freedom. Harris argues that Hegel accepts Kant’s regulative idea 
of holiness but it is Sittlichkeit (ethical conduct) that Hegel has in mind as the concrete 
ideal that can actually be realized. Holiness on the other hand is an infinite process.37 
A quite innovative reading of Joshua Goldstein saw in Tübingen Essay, the seed 
of Hegelian reoccurring idea of being at home in world. He suggests that by stating that 
‘religion must help man build his own house’, Hegel does not talk only metaphorically 
but also affirms literally that religion is the solution to being at home in the world. Folk 
religion directs human spirit to this world not some other world, because it is humane. 
Unity in folk religion is not won against the external world of institutions, but 
necessitates them (culture, education) for the actualization of human capacities.   38  
  
 The model he has in mind is the ancient Greek society in which its religious and 
public institutions are integrated into a harmonious whole. With respect to the three 
requirements of folk-religion; reasonability, sensibility and publicity, Harris develops a 
model. He argues that minimum standard of rationality is met by Jewish religion. 
Secondly Catholicism especially satisfies the second requirement of sensibility. But 
publicity, the linkage with all the needs of life and pubic affairs, is only accomplished 
by Greeks. 39 
 
In Tübingen Essay, Hegel refers to Greek faith and takes the model of popular 
festival of Greeks which are at the same time religious festivals in the honor of a god as 
a model for the ceremonies of folk religion.40 However, depending on the necessity that 
he attributes to private religion, I argue that early religious thought of Hegel also 
implicitly deviates from Greek ideal.  
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Lastly, in this section it is also urgent to refer to the eligibility of Christian 
religion as a folk-religion. In Berne Plan of 1794, Hegel identifies Christianity as a 
private religion. He states that it is not designed for imagination as with the Greeks, it is 
a sad and melancholic religion, its ceremonies lost their spirit and it commands 
withdrawal from public affairs.41  
In summary, folk religion is an ideal form of religion which is conductive to build 
a community of virtue and love. This religion does not stay external to other public 
institutions but constitutes the belief of a fully integrated and harmonious society. This 
ideal society heavily draws upon ancient Greece. However, since there is room for 
individual private faith, it has been argued that it transcends the Greek ideal as well. 
Folk religion, has its purpose of building a communal morality, and in turn does 
contribute to political freedom by creating noble dispositions in people. Legal and 
religious institutions vary in their purposes but mutually reinforce each other and 
together make up the spirit of people. Christianity in this discussion appears as a private 
religion and could not be integrated to public affairs in its essence. Next two section of 
this work deals with Christianity and its relation to civil and legal sphere in Hegel’s 
early works in a more detailed manner. The section titled as Autonomy and Authority, 
on the whole, discusses the distinction between Christianity as the moral religion of 
freedom and its degeneration into a political organization. The last section of this 
chapter; Community and Law put emphasis on Hegel’s elevation of early Christianity 
above both legality and morality. 
   
 2.2   Autonomy and Authority 
During his stay in Berne (1793- 1796) as a private tutor, Hegel has continued to 
think and write on Christianity, later his essays of this period are collected and 
reconstructed under the title;  Positivity of Christian Religion (Positivity). This work is 
inconsistent especially when the divergent and contradictory analysis of Christian 
religion that is given in the main text of Positivity and the later added part; How 
Christianity Conquered Paganism are considered. In this later added part, Hegel is more 
critical of Christian religion which he thinks that suited for the needs of corrupt and 
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unfree people, whereas in the main text of Positivity, Hegel talks of Christian religion, 
at least in its earliest inception, as the religion of freedom 
 In this section, I will first start from the added part of Positivity essay; How 
Christianity Conquered Paganism. In this part, emergence of Christian religion is linked 
to the fall of Ancient Greece and Roman Republic and rise of Rome as an empire. This 
corresponds to loss of freedom and emergence of Christianity as a slave religion.  
Secondly I will turn to the analysis of the main text of Positivity essay. In Positivity 
briefly, Hegel compares two types of religion; one based on autonomy and other on 
authority by which he means positive religion. Christianity degenerates, throughout its 
history into a positive; authoritarian form of religion, the excess point of which is 
church’s subordination of civil state and appearance of itself as a political/legal 
institution.  
To start, Hegel describes Greeks and Romans as free men and their religion which 
is suitable for free people only. Indeed; 
 As free men the Greeks and Romans obeyed laws laid down by 
themselves, obeyed men whom they had themselves appointed 
to office, waged war on which they had themselves decided, 
gave their property, exhausted their passions, and sacrificed their 
lives by thousands for an end which was their own. They neither 
learned nor thought [a moral system] but evidenced by their 
actions the moral maxim (222) which they could call their own. 
In public as in private and domestic life, every individual was a 
free man, one who lived by his own laws42.  
 
 Therefore Greeks and Romans were autonomous people in their implicit morality and 
democratic in their political constitution. Their free spirit was further integrated by their 
religion.43  In his idealizing Greek and Romans but, as Lukács once has noted, Hegel 
totally disregard slavery at this point. According to Lukács, Hegelian conception of 
classical society is classless. But as soon as class distinctions emerged, the freedom 
came to an end.44 In line with Lukács’ comment, Hegel adopts a materialist explanation 
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for the fall of Roman Republic. In fact, he asserts that emergence of an aristocracy of 
wealth and military glory is the reason behind the end of autonomy in Roman 
Republic.45  Moreover, the imperial ambitions of Ancient Rome; the subjection of 
number of states from both east and west to its power, has furthered this process. 
Imperial Rome, with its aristocracy of wealth is no longer a free state. Quoting 
Montesquieu, Hegel affirms that Rome lost its republican virtue which was being ready 
to give one’s life for an ideal. This in turn, prepared the way to the rise of individualism, 
which characterized the spirit of citizens in Imperial Rome. What happened was that 
citizens could no longer see the state as product of their own labor. This new 
mechanical state, as Hegel describes it, treats each individual as cogs in a machine. 
Individual can no longer relate himself to the state; the administration of which is now 
secured in the hands of small number of rulers.46  Loosing his connection with the 
whole, citizen was compelled to work for himself or for some other individual. Political 
freedom was lost and replaced by mere right of property. Individual, alienated from his 
fellows, feels the terror of death which he had little idea previously, and this profoundly 
alters individual’s relationship with his own existence. This new existence requires a 
different conception of deity which will appear as an alien, infinite master.47 During the 
Republican period, citizens did not need to seek refuge in their gods in front of death, 
since the republic survived them. Thus, under the despotism of Roman rulers, which 
alienated citizens not only from the political life, but also from their entire existence, 
emerges Christian God. The realization of autonomy can no longer be willed but wished 
for from a divine being in a passive mood. This divine being in Christian religion, 
which shares nothing in common with human beings, has the right to all legislation. 
Moral autonomy is not a law of man but becomes exclusively a divine trait. Christian 
consciousness becomes an unhappy consciousness which expect happiness in some 
other world. The idea of church replaces the free polity and church is intimately linked 
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to heaven.48 Christians are not interested in state which they are not active in its 
workings, but in the transcendent Kingdom of God. Kojѐve in his analysis of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit argues that unhappy consciousness is the slave consciousness 
of Christianity. Christian tries to flee from slavery by creating another world in which 
his master and himself are equal in front of God. But Christian only frees himself from 
his human master by subjection to a divine master. Apart from freeing himself, the 
entire essence of Christian becomes slavery. Christian slave is more slave than pagan 
slave since he is mastered both in his inner essence and outer existence. According to 
the reading of Kojѐve, overcoming this opposition is only possible by acceptance of 
death and by implication atheism. For Kojѐve, the dialectic in world history takes the 
direction towards atheistic awareness of essential finiteness of human existence.49 Hegel 
but, did never further his criticism of Christianity to the level of atheism. Firstly, later in 
his Philosophy of History he argues that under Christianity, slavery is impossible, since 
in principle man is man before God. Greek independent subjectivity, on the other hand 
is still conditioned by slaves and oracles.50 But this does not mean that, Christianity 
never become authoritarian in its history. His early writings emphasize mostly the 
oppressive and alienating forms that Christianity takes until modern times. He opposed 
to the doctrine of two-separate kingdoms; Augustinian51 understanding of purely secular 
world which has no spiritual aspects and which transforms Christian into an exile in this 
world. But if finding an identity with god and world is a kind of atheism, Hegel would 
certainly be a candidate. In fact, this is the charge against Spinozism in Hegel’s life 
time. Hegel however while considering Spinoza in his Encyclopedia, rejects to consider 
this affirmation as a form of atheism. He argues that; 
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A philosophy which affirms that God and God alone is should not 
be stigmatized as atheistic, when even those nations which worship 
the ape, or the cow, or the image of stone and brass are credited with 
some religion.52  
 
Furthermore, whether Hegel rejects the Christianity or defending it in a way is the point 
where his followers begin to diverge as Left and Right Hegelians. Left upholds that 
Hegelian conception of Christianity is secular in its content, whereas Right reads Hegel 
as providing a rational basis to traditional Christianity.53 This thesis contents to show 
that Hegelian Christianity significantly differs from traditional Christianity. Hegel’s 
central problem is Christian in its origin; deportation of Christian in this world. But the 
solution he offers, is arguably the one in which Christianity has a very limited practical 
role. On the other hand but, furtherance of Left position to the point of materialist 
atheism has limited textual support in Hegel’s early writings. As Birchall has argued 
Hegelian critique of religion is a critique in Heiddegerian sense; a two sided process of 
distangling of truth from error, not only fault finding.54 Truth of Christianity in the main 
text of Positivity appears as moral autonomy which will be discussed below. 
In the main text of Positivity essay, Hegel talks about Jesus intention to be 
establishment of moral autonomy. But the history of Christianity is the story of the loss 
of this autonomy, the culmination of which is the degeneration of church from a 
community of friendship into a state.  In the essay, Christian religion in its seminal form 
is conceived in term freedom. It is contrasted with positive faith which grounds itself on 
authority. 55 It is also important to emphasize that state in abstraction is not a self-
actualizing agent of freedom in this early period of Hegel. In German Constitution 
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which he started to write two years after Positivity essay reflects his idea of state as 
necessarily a positive institution. Indeed, at that period Hegel argued that only a mass of 
people can be accepted as state if it forms a common military force and political 
authority.56 His notion of law approximates to legal positivism in its strict demarcation 
between civil law and morality and in its emphasis on the author but not the content of 
law while describing the civil law. 
Hegel in this essay make Jesus preacher of Kantian morality.57 According to him, 
in the teaching of Jesus, fundamental condition of God’s favor was following the moral 
law which one himself is the author.  Jesus for Hegel "undertook to raise religion and 
virtue to morality and to restore morality to the freedom which is its essence…instead 
of obedience, he ascribed value to moral law." 58 But although, the aim of Jesus was 
autonomy; virtue that is grounded not on authority but which emerges from man’s own 
being, he has to insert some positive elements to his teaching due to the condition of 
Jewish society at his time. Indeed, Jewish people for Hegel were not capable of 
understanding this call of Jesus, so he had to apply to miracles, and appeal to their 
Messianic hope.  Miracles became the basis of faith in Jews and Jesus who performed 
them, appeared as the authority of the new religion. Secondly, Jews could accept a 
teaching which is different then their own only if it was presented by awaited Messiah 
who would rebuild Jewish state from its foundation. The religious and moral commands 
of Judaism was at the same time law of the land and laws of that kind, suggests Hegel, 
can only produce legality not morality. Jesus, who intends to change their attitude of 
                                               
 
56 G. W. F Hegel, German Constitution (1798- 1802) in Hegel, Political Writings (ed) 
Lurence Dickey, (ed) trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 
1999), p.16  
 
 
57 We know that approaching Christianity from Kantian perspective was adopted by 
some teachers of Hegel in Tübingen Stiff. A young tutor, Immanuel Diez, declared Kant 
as the true messiah and Jesus as the betrayer of reason. See H. S. Harris, Hegel’s 
Development to 1807 in The Cambridge Companion to Hegel (ed) Frederich C. Beiser, 
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, New York, 1993), p. 27. Please also see 
Laurence Dickey, Hegel. Religion, Economics, and the Politics of Spirit (Cambridge 
University Pres: Cambridge, New York, 1987), pp. 157- 158 
 
58 G. W. F.  Hegel, The Positivity of Christian Religion in On Christianity: Early 
Theological Writings (trans) T. M. Knox ( Harper Torchbooks: New York, 1961), pp. 
69 – 70 
 
 20 
mind showed that morality can contradict with what was required by the civil laws and 
those religious commands which had become civil laws. He tried to show that 
observance of these commands is not the essence of virtue but only acting out of respect 
for duty that man can become virtuous.59 However to change their mind, Jesus himself 
had to introduce authority of his personality into his teaching as a messiah who could 
perform miracles. This is the first element of positivity which has its source in Jesus 
himself.   
Second element of positivity, comes from disciples. For Hegel, disciples lack 
spiritual energy of their own and are heavily dependent on Jesus. They did not attain 
freedom and truth by their own labor but through Jesus. They tried to understand and 
protect this doctrine of Jesus faithfully and transmit it to others without any addition 
and transformation.60 This was the only way of establishing Christianity as a public 
religion. Hegel contrasts the disciples with the pupils of Socrates and asserts that the 
latter had their own distinctive aims and used their own capacities and established their 
own schools. As Harris has noted, they did not isolate themselves from their public and 
private lives as did the disciples of Jesus. 61 Moreover the command to spread the 
doctrine of Jesus and his name, make disciples of Jesus authoritative figures. This 
command is the second step in rise of Christianity as a positive religion.  
The third element of positivity comes from expansion of Christianity. The section 
of Positivity essay titled as What is Applicable in a Small Society is Unjust in a State 
explains the negative results of this expansion.62 For Lukács, Hegel here relies on 
Rousseau’s idea of quantitative changes bring about qualitative differences in 
democracies.  Rousseau argued in Social Contract that quantitative expansion of 
democracy can be quite dangerous and fatal for democracies. Lukács suggests that this 
idea is taken from Rousseau by Hegel, and is applied to Christianity.63 Indeed, Hegel 
argues that: 
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Purely as a result of the fact that the number of the Christians 
increased and finally comprised all the citizens in the state, ordinances 
and institutions, which hurt no one’s right while the society was still 
small, were made political and civil obligations which they could 
never in fact become.64 
 
The early Christian community was a community of friendship based on shared faith. 
The main traits of this community were common ownership of goods and equality. Hegel 
suggest that canceling of property suits well to the man who has no possessions, but is a 
serious problem who had property and for whom this was the whole sphere of his activity 
before joining to the community. This principle of common ownership could not be 
retained. If it was retained, this would be detrimental to the further expansion of 
Christianity. But free offerings, as a means of buying place from heaven, is introduced 
instead.  Not to mention improving the condition of poor, says Hegel, these free offerings 
of charity did only enrich monasteries, churches and priests and made rest of mankind 
beggars. Moreover, the meaning of equality has also changed over time. Equality was the 
principle of the early Christians. Slave was brother of his master. The value of man was 
not to be found in honors, dignity, talents etc. but only in faith. This principle did not 
disappear but started to be understood as equality in the eyes of heaven which has little 
earthly implications.65 Moreover, growth of Christian community into a universal church 
made what was once a matter of free will, an obligation. Indeed, confession of one’s fault 
was not a voluntary act of disclosure to a close friend but became a duty of every citizen 
of this spiritual state. Secondly, early Church was a kind of representative republic, for 
Hegel.66 Each congregation had the right to choose its own bishops. But “when church 
expanded and became a state, this right was lost.’’ 67 Church by becoming a state turns 
out to be a source of rights and duties, parallel to civil state. Its chief aim is surveillance 
of Christian morality. It has power to punish sinful impulses and thoughts which is 
outside the scope of state. If a crime against temporal state is also a sin, it is punished by 
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church as well. In canon law says Hegel; the list of punishments is endless. However, 
this spiritual state now produces the opposite of the basic promise. State has legality as 
its proper aim for Hegel. But it is state’s greatest interest to ensure that its citizens are 
also morally good. Doing this directly, by enacting laws on morality is a contradiction 
since morality is following one’s own reason, not observing the commands of laws 
created by civil authority.  Enforcing the ordinances of religion as civil laws is 
contradictory in a similar vein. It is therefore the very condition of autonomy that state 
and religion should be separated.  But as it is the interest of state that its citizens should 
also be moral and religion is the best way of ensuring this, state needs help of religion 
indirectly. Religious community of a small size; as a bond of friendship, could only 
realize this objective by means of mutual encouragement and reward without doing harm 
to rights of other individuals and state. 68 In brief, Hegel suggests that to perform its true 
function church must return to its original form. Otherwise there will always be conflict 
between church and civil state which are detrimental to the rights of individuals. As 
parallel legislative powers, civil state and church are by nature incompatible. As an 
executive power Catholic Church claims independence of civil state. Protestant church 
on the other hand, has subordinated itself to the civil state but when there is a 
contradiction between church and state, it is always civil state which had to sacrifice its 
right in both protestant and catholic countries.  
 Further problem arises when all the members of state are united in a church. Such 
a society has right to exclude anyone who does not consent to its laws.  Church in such 
society claims right to exclude any citizen who does not adopt its faith and since the 
church embraces the whole state, the dissenter is also excluded from the civil state as 
well. Moreover, Hegel’s conception of state in Positivity essay is interestingly quite 
liberal. State is a contract of all with all to create a legal system for protection of 
personality and property and this has nothing to do with religious opinion of individuals. 
But when church’s right as an ecclesiastical state prevails over the civil state, the civil 
rights of individuals are invaded and this is the case in both catholic and protestant states. 
Dissenters in these states can not acquire real estate, hold public office and can be 
subjected to a different treatment of taxation. Although asserting that Protestant countries 
are much tolerant in these matters, Hegel did not exclude them from his criticism of 
violation of rights. Indeed, in protestant countries failure to attend public worship on 
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repetition meant punishment for Jews.69  But apart from this, says Hegel, protestant 
church did not go beyond its limits.  
 Further conflict arises between church and state in matters of education.  Hegel 
argues that granting the duty to educate children in the hands of church is detrimental to 
man’s free development. This duty is imposed primarily on families and state, but state 
had transferred this responsibility to church. Church educates child to believe in faith, 
whereas reason and intellect are not trained to develop their own principles. In fact, 
church’s educational methods substitute reason and intellect to religious speculation and 
fill the imagination with terrors of other world. Reason and intellect are deprived of their 
freedom. This for Hegel, is not education but the very violation of right to education.70 
To sum, Hegel argues that when church grows from a small community of 
believers and acquire state like characteristics, it becomes an oppressive institution and 
deviates from the real message of Jesus.71 Christians, under the authority of Roman 
Catholic Church is reverted back to the position of Jews whose character is mostly 
shaped by obedience to authority. This has been detrimental to the development of 
autonomous spirit which Hegel attributes to Jesus. Christianity but event went further 
than Judaism, in the sense that Judaism commands only actions but church try to control 
by prescribing laws for every mode of thinking, feeling, being and acting.72 For 
autonomous individual to emerge, church must be restored to its original form. 
Sectarian tendencies in the middle ages and modern times are attempts of returning to 
the original message of Christianity, but it is inevitable that these sects also lean towards 
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ecclesiastical state all over again. 73 Here, Hegel seems to accept that positivity is 
inevitable. Accordingly, Avineri argues that Hegel in his later period admits the 
immutable patterns of history and cancels the criticism of positivity.74  In the collection 
of essays titled as the Spirit of Christianity and its Fate, beside positivity of 
Christianity, the alienation, as a distinct condition of unfreedom is also attributed to 
Christianity. Besides, Hegel profoundly transforms his hierarchy of morality, religion 
and legality in that work.  
         
 
 
          3) Community of Love and Law  
 
 
 Spirit of Christianity and its Fate is the last manuscript in Hegel’s pre-Jena 
period that deals with Christianity in a detailed manner. This essay is written during 
1798 – 1799, while Hegel was working as a private tutor in Frankfurt. In this 
manuscript Hegel no longer equates morality with religion as opposed to legality, but 
elevates religion above both morality and legality. It appears to Hegel that Kantian 
morality, in its taking reason as the authority and suppression of inclinations, is also 
positive and therefore does not differ much from legality. Jesus, on the other hand, rises 
above both moral law and civil law through love and reconciliation. The history of 
Christianity is more or less the same; its liberating potential is not realized. However, 
this time, he does not emphasize oppressive church but the tendency of Christianity to 
alienate itself from the actual world of politics since the time of Jesus. But the pure 
example of alienated spirit is Jewish spirit, for Hegel. I will first start from his criticism 
of Jewish spirit and then turn to his renewed understanding of morality, religion and 
legality. Lastly, the conditions of the alienation of the community of love from actuality 
and possible solutions to this problem will be discussed.  
Hegel traces history of Judaism back to Noah. Noah, for Hegel, saved himself 
from the hostile power of nature by subjecting both himself and nature to something 
more powerful. This new powerful being promised Noah that no flood would destroy 
                                               
73 G. W. F.  Hegel, The Positivity of Christian Religion in On Christianity: Early 
Theological Writings (trans) T. M. Knox ( Harper Torchbooks: New York, 1961), p. 
142 
 
74 Avineri Sholomo, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State (Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 1972), p. 28 
 
 25 
mankind ever again if they set themselves within their limits. The mankind was 
subjected to the law of this new being (god) which commands them not to kill each 
other. Transgressing this command was to fall under the power of this being and loosing 
one’s life. The servitude of mankind to this new alien being is recompensed by ‘being 
given mastery over animals’ Hegel reads this new mastery over nature that is conceived 
as hostile, as alienation from nature. Abraham furthers this process by alienating man 
from man and man from god. In Hegel’s mind, Abraham has an alienated personality. 
He left his country, family and kins ‘to be a wholly self-subsistent, independent man, to 
be an overlord himself. In his encounters with strangers he kept his relation on legal 
base and did not go beyond that.75 Hegel describes Abraham in the following way;  
 
 He was a stranger on earth, a stranger to the soil and to man alike. 
Among man he always was and remained a foreigner, yet not so 
removed from them and independent of them that he needed to 
know nothing of them whatever, to have nothing whatever to do 
with them.76  
  
Abraham, having such a personality, did come up with an idea of god that has nothing 
in common with world. According to Hegel; 
 
 The whole world of Abraham regarded as simply his opposite; if he 
did not take it to be a nullity; he looked on it as sustained by the God 
who was alien to it. Nothing in nature was supposed to have any part 
in God; everything was simply under God’s mastery. 77 
 
Moses, on the other hand, who appears as the liberator of Judaism, did nothing 
but furthered this process of alienation, says Hegel. Quoting from Hegel; 
  
The liberator of this nation was also its lawgiver; this could only mean 
that the man who had freed it from one yoke had laid it on it other. A 
passive people giving laws to itself would be a contradiction. 78 
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Sanctions of the Law of Moses were loss of pleasure and fortune. Hegel thinks, quite 
prejudiciously, that this terror of physical force is consistent with the image of their 
slavish spirit. What Jews wanted was only possession of land and posterity, for Hegel. 
They did not rise above the physical existence. The existence of god was not a truth but a 
command for them. After the death of Moses, Jews lived for a while independently and 
then throughout their long history, they were mostly subjected to foreign nations. 
According to Hegel, the slave-like faith of Jews has its source in their conception of god 
as an alien being. What hold Jews together were, chains; laws given to them by this 
superior power. They did not make any distinction between religious, moral and civil 
laws and all were equally positive; coming form an alien god which stands in absolute 
opposition to human beings.79  
 Jesus came to scene in this condition of slavery and opposed to Jewish fate wholly. 
As Harris has rightly asserted; Jesus opposed to the whole spirit of opposition and to that 
effect, he is also opposed to the faith of Judaism.80  Against purely positive commands of 
Jews, Jesus set the principle of subjectivity. What Jesus demanded was the “elevation 
above the sphere of rights, justice, equity and property.’’81  Moreover, Hegel describes 
the spirit of Jesus which goes also beyond the morality, therefore strictly deviates from 
his commitment to Kant in Positivity essay. Indeed, Hegel argues that; 
…but he (Jesus) took a different attitude to those laws which from 
varying points of we call either moral or civil commands. Since it is 
natural relations which these express in the form of commands, it is 
perverse to make them wholly or partly objective.82  
 
Hegel defines law as unification of opposites in a concept. As a concept, but law 
exist in opposition to reality and has the form of ought.  The moral law unifies the 
opposite powers of individual in thinking, whereas in civil law clashing interests of 
individuals, groups are united by an external force. Hegel argues, contrary to his previous 
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position that acting out of respect for moral law does not make one autonomous. It is not 
the case that one who obeys civil law is slave, and other who listens the commands of his 
reason, is free. The only difference between them is that while the former has his lord 
outside, the other let himself to be mastered inside.83 According to Kant one should act 
out of respect for duty no matter what his inclination is. Kant argues that an action done 
for the sake of duty has to set aside all the effect of inclination and every object of will 
until there is nothing left to determine the will except its own maxim.84  But Jesus, tells 
Hegel, can not act in accordance with the duty and contradict inclination because both 
inclination and duty are part of the spirit. Therefore, Jesus is; 
 …a spirit raised above morality, is visible, directly attacking laws, in 
the Sermon on the Mount, which is an attempt, elaborated in 
numerous examples, to strip the laws of legality, of their legal form. 
The Sermon does not teach reverence for the laws; on the contrary, it 
exhibits that which fulfills the law but annuls law and so higher than 
obedience to law and makes law superfluous. Since the commands of 
duty presuppose a cleavage [between reason and inclination] and 
since the domination of concept declares itself in a “thou shalt’’ that 
which is raised above this cleavage is by contrast an “is’’, a 
modification of life…85  
 
 
This point is important since the first traces of dialectics are manifested which will be 
central to his mature thought, as Dallmayr has pointed out. 86 What Hegel ascribes to 
Jesus, namely; ‘unification of inclination with the law whereby the latter loses its form 
as law’ is a dialectical process in the sense that opposites are united, in the higher 
reality of life. Indeed here, ought is replaced by an ‘is’ and ‘is’ for Hegel is the 
synthesis of subject and object where they loose their opposition. Accordingly, virtue is 
a synthesis in which both subject as a particularity and law, as universal, lose their 
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opposition. For Hegel, Kant could not resolve this opposition, in his conception of 
virtue, universal becomes the master and particular the mastered. This is the spirit of 
reconcilability of Jesus in which the law loses its form and the concept is displaced by 
life. Jesus did not opposed to Jewish complete subjection under an alien lord by 
subjecting particular beings to their own moral law. What he thought was virtues 
without authority, virtues which are modifications of love. Reconciliation in love is 
liberation in contrast to Jewish reversion to obedience. This spirit cancels the whole 
authority and establishes a living bond of love among human beings which now Hegel 
considers to be the highest freedom. Love itself can not be commanded since it annuls 
all authority. Hegel defines love as “sensing of a life similar to one’s own, not a 
stronger or a weaker one.’’87  This new perspective of Hegel which identifies freedom 
not with moral autonomy but with love needs to be stressed. Harris suggests that for 
understanding the centrality of love, we should consider Plato’s Symposium and 
Phaedrus and romantic Spinozism of Hegel’s own time. Harris claims that Hegel, 
similar to Plato, believes that love is the most significant manifestation of reason as a 
living bond. Moreover, the affinity to the Christian doctrine of ‘God is love’ is quite 
apparent. But according to Harris, Hegel is not thinking primarily in terms of this 
doctrine.88 Richard Kroner on the other hand reads this twist of Hegel as a significant 
shift of perspective from that of enlightenment to romanticism.89 Charles Taylor in a 
different context argued that Hegel’s work in general, is an attempt of combining the 
two aspirations of Romantic generation which are specified as aspiration to radical 
autonomy and expressive unity with nature and society.90  It is true that Hegel shares 
with early romantics these aspirations but in the context of this chapter, it is also 
important to point out different attitudes that late Romantics’ and Hegel adopted 
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towards religion. Indeed, after the disappointment of French revolution romantics turn 
back to church and monarchy as true models of institutions during the restoration 
period. The ideal church was that of medieval church.91 Moreover as a reaction to 
rationalism they converted to Catholicism and blamed Protestantism for breaking the 
organic development of humanity. Hegel on the other hand has always valued 
Protestantism as a world historical event that contribute to the actualization of freedom 
in world which was the initial trust of Christianity, and interpreted Romantics’ 
conversion to Catholicism as a voluntary acceptance of  intellectual servitude.92  
Thus, in his emphasis on love in this essay, it is true that Hegel comes close to 
Romantics, but this shift of emphasis does extend to the point of abjuring his trust on 
reason that he shares with enlightenment. In fact, love for Hegel is not absolutely a 
religious action.  But religious is fulfillment of love. It is the unification of reflection 
and love in thought.93 Hegel is not arguing against reflective rationality here, but wants 
to transcend it by love and make the promise of reason real in life through 
reconciliation. Furthermore, Hegel’s idea of divine is similar to his conception of love. 
Hegel suggests that ‘the activity of the divine is only a unification of spirits.94  The 
divine is pure life and it is free from any opposition. The divine is God as spirit. God as 
spirit is not an alien lord as in Judaism. The conception of Jesus’ relationship to God in 
terms of father and son reveals this in the way that they are not of opposite essences but 
the modifications of the same essence. Jesus is not only son of God, but is also son of 
man. There is no opposition between divine and man; divine appears in the shape of a 
man. For Hegel, we can have faith in the divine if we have something divine in 
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ourselves.95 The kingdom of god is not heaven but is the development of the divine 
among men, the living unity of men with his fellows in God. Indeed; 
In the Kingdom of God what is common to all is life in God, love, a 
living bond which unites the believers, it is the feeling of unity of life, 
a feeling in which all opposition, all pure enmities, and also rights are 
annulled…They make up not a collection but community since they 
are unified not in a concept but through life and love…This idea of 
Kingdom of God completes and comprises the whole of the 
[Christian] religion as Jesus founded it. 96  
 
This Kingdom of God which Hegel takes to be the worldly community of love united in 
God could not be realized in its full potential in this world, because Jesus’ relation with 
state was passive, and so a crucial part of freedom was lost. In fact, reaction of Pharisees 
(Jews of Jesus’ time) to the call of Jesus was indifference and hostility. Jesus did not 
attempt to reconcile himself with all of them but restricted himself to the working on few 
individuals. Subjection to Roman taxation like Jews, although was a contradiction, Jesus 
again made no resistance. Instead, he adopted the principle of giving unto Caesar what is 
Caesar’s and started to talk about the Kingdom of God as not of this world. Accordingly, 
the citizens of the Kingdom of God became private persons, excluding themselves from a 
hostile state.97 Hegel describes this fate of Christianity in the following way; 
“Since the state was there neither Jesus nor his followings could annul it, 
the fate of Jesus and his followings remains a loss of freedom.’’98  
It is a loss of freedom since, there is an element of opposition introduced here, between 
God and world, between terrestrial city and city of god and this is contrary to the spirit 
of Jesus in Hegel’s mind who attempted to transcend all opposition through 
reconciliation and love. In all forms of Christian faith, including Protestantism, this 
opposition between god and word is upheld. 99 How this opposition between kingdom 
of god and the earthly state would be overcome, becomes the central problem of Hegel 
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in his early period that he will attempt to solve in his mature philosophy.  One way of 
overcoming the opposition is annulling state totally as envisaged in Earliest System 
Programme of German Idealism. Indeed it is written there that; 
Since state is a mechanical thing, it gives us only an idea of 
machine. Only something that is objective of freedom is called an 
Idea so we must go even beyond the state. For every state must 
treat free men as cogs in a machine; and this, it ought not to. So it 
must stop.100 
 
Hegel himself would not choose this path. Moreover there is a further problem in modern 
society which hinders reconstruction of community of love as a kingdom of god. Indeed 
Hegel during Frankfurt years started to study economics and he knows that the idea of 
community of love when applied to property does not work.101 Property always involves 
a distinction between mine and thine.102 For Lukács concepts such as love that Hegel 
applies always includes elements of protest against capitalist system. 103 Nevertheless 
Hegel does view property as the embodiment of freedom and does not seem to be willing 
to give it up. That is partly why John Rawls take him to belong to the tradition of 
liberalism of freedom. Indeed, political and civil freedoms have priority over other 
principles in Hegel’s thought and that makes Hegel a reform minded liberal, according to 
Rawls.104   
Second path and the one that Hegel chooses, this thesis argues, is the 
spiritualization of state so that there would be no opposition between kingdom of god 
and earthly power. Indeed, this thesis highlights that the central difference between 
Hegel’s early thought and his mature philosophy is their different understandings of 
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state. In his early period, state for Hegel or legal/political sphere in general depends on 
force and authority whereas original Christianity is an expression of freedom whether in 
the form of morality or in the form of reconcilability. Reformation actualized the 
Christian freedom by eliminating the power of church.105In other words it eliminated the 
positivity in a way, but not alienation entirely. Since reforming church, where state itself 
is oppressive does not eliminate alienation as a Christian problem.  For this; the ethical, 
legal and political system should also be reformed106 and grounded on freedom. French 
revolution is an attempt to construct such a system but it can not sustain itself, since 
France is a catholic country and so church and state is opposed there. The shape of this 
reformed ethical, legal, political system grounded on freedom is explored and explained 
in his later political philosophy, which will be analyzed in the next chapters. For now on, 
it is sufficient to tell that, religion appears at the foundation of this new system both 
historically and metaphysically but plays a very limited role inside the system, as will be 
seen. However, religion goes beyond and above state and appears as a form of 
knowledge, although an inadequate one. Separation of religion and state is still preserved 
but is not conceived as a separation of opposites.  
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CHAPTER 3: 
 
RELIGION AT THE FOUNDATION OF STATE 
3. 1 History, Providence, State 
It is said that Machiavelli invented secular politics by divorcing it from religion 
and natural law. He distinguished between Christian virtues and virtù, which for him 
meant necessary powers and skills to achieve a political and a military goal.  State was 
taken no longer as a corporate body serving the interest of its members but an 
instrument of power and domination. Parallel to his understanding of state, Machiavelli 
also believed that history is driven more by accident than reason. He substituted fortune 
for providence and argued that history is not a linear progress which will end in the 
second coming of Christ but a cycle of human success and failure.107  Since that time, as 
Alan Wood has argued, the state has been defined as a coercive institution. For liberals 
it was the protector of individual rights and liberties, for conservatives a guarantor of 
peace and order and for radicals the promoters of ruling class interest, but implicitly, all 
agree on that state is an enforcer. Hegel, on the other hand, distinguishes himself from 
all modern theorists by arguing that state is primarily an ethical institution founded on 
freedom108 History on the other hand appears as a rational process in Hegel’s system. 
Unlike Machiavelli, he thinks that events in history can not be explained by chance or 
external contingent causes, there is a providence that controls it. 109 Joseph de Maistre, 
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Hegel’s contemporary in France, similarly believed in the invisible hand of a 
providence governing the events in history. Indeed, any disorder in history was 
commanded by a sovereign for contributing to a higher good. The history starts from the 
fall and the several epochs of it are defined in biblical term. Man; born with original sin, 
is radically evil and social order can only be maintained by regular application of 
violence. Moreover, Maistre considers French Revolution as one of the most terrible 
events in history. Any possible human institution must be based on a religious concept 
and a form of government based on human reason alone is destined to fail from the very 
beginning. The terror and revolutionary wars following the French revolution were 
understood as punishments of Providence by Maistre.110  Hegel similarly believed in the 
hand of providence in history and to some extent shares Maistre’s critical attitude 
towards French Revolution. Moreover, Hegel also thinks that religion is the basis of 
state. Isaiah Berlin in an essay on Maistre argued that this deeply pessimistic vision is 
central to totalitarianism.111 Hegel has rightly been criticized for his providential, 
dialectical understanding of history, which can justify any type of oppression as the will 
of God. However, surprisingly Hegel’s philosophy of history shares enlightenment’s 
confidence in progress.112  Indeed, he states that history is ‘the development of 
consciousness of freedom.’ The actor of this progress is World Spirit (Geist) whose 
essence is freedom. 113  There is debate in Hegel literature whether this World Spirit can 
be identified with human spirit or above humans spirit there is God, or some cosmic 
entity, using human beings in history to realize itself, whose realization means 
achievement of self consciousness as Spirit. Feuerbach, one of the earliest follower and 
critic of Hegel argued that Hegelian philosophy is alienating, since it attributes man’s 
own wishes, fears and needs to God. For Feuerbach, all the attributes of God are 
nothing but traits of human nature.114  Furthermore Houlgate’s and Solomon’s115 
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analyses suggest that Hegel’s Spirit is actually nothing more than human spirit. Whereas 
Paul Lakeland claims that Hegel’s Spirit and its manifestation in history has its origin in 
Christian theological symbols such as trinity and incarnation, but such symbols are 
unfamiliar to philosophers, scientists and public at large, thus they can not see the 
affinity.116 Charles Taylor on the other hand does not mention God, but argues that 
Hegel’s Spirit is not identical with human spirit. However, it is equally not a super-
individual subject of society, as assumed. According to Charles Taylor, ‘there is only a 
very difficult doctrine of a cosmic subject whose vehicle is man.’ 117 in Hegel’s 
philosophy. Hegel himself makes it clear that his Spirit is not identical with 
transcendent personal god of traditional theism. But he still claims that Spirit is most 
adequately expressed in Christianity as the revealed religion but best in his speculative 
philosophy. Indeed he asserts in Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion that God is 
Spirit insofar it is in his community.118 Moreover, a Spirit which does not manifest itself 
becomes a dead Spirit. Quoting from Hegel; 
Spirit if it is thought immediately, simply at rest is no spirit. For 
spirit’s essential character is to be altogether active. More exactly, it 
is the activity of self-manifestation…Manifesting signifies 
becoming for an other. As becoming for an other, it enters into 
antithesis, into distinction in general, and thus is a finitizing of 
spirit…This spirit that manifest itself, determines itself, enter into 
                                                                                                                                         
114 Timothy Luther, Hegel’s Critique of Modernity. Reconciling Individual Freedom 
and Community (Lexington Books: Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • 
Plymouth, UK, 2009), p. 260 
 
 
115 For Stephen Houlgate Hegel’s history of Spirit is a history of civilizations, there is 
no metaphysical subject which exists prior to human history. See. Stephen Houlgate, 
World History as the Progress of Consciousness: An Interpretation of Hegel’s 
Philosophy of History in G. W. F. Hegel. Critical Assessments. (ed) Robert Sern. 
Volume IV (Routledge: London, New York, 1993), p. 409. Solomon on the other hand 
takes the Spirit to be our shared recognition of our mutual interdependence and ultimate 
collective identity. Please see Solomon Robert C., Continental Philosophy since 1750. 
The Rise and Fall of the Self (Oxford University Press: Oxford, New York, 1988), p. 61 
 
116 Paul Lakeland, The Politics of Salvation: The Hegelian Idea of the State (State 
University of New York Press: Albany, 1984), p. 14 
 
117 Charles Taylor,  Hegel (Cambridge University Pres: New York, 1977), p. 385 
 
118 G. W. F.  Hegel, Lectures On the Philosophy of Religion. (ed)  Peter C. Hodgson, 
(trans.) R.F. Brown, P.C. Hodgson, and J.M. Stewart, with the assistance of H.S. Harris. 
(University of California Press: Berkeley, 1988), p. 90 
 
 36 
existence, gives itself finitude, it is the second moment. But the third 
is manifesting of itself according to its concepts, taking its initial 
manifestation back into itself, sublating it, coming to its own self 
and being explicitly the way it is implicitly…The third moment is 
that it is the object to itself, is reconciled with itself in the object, 
has arrived at freedom.119  
 
Apart from this mystic language of spirit, Hegel also describes the process of world 
history as development of the Idea of freedom. In purely secular terms, he takes the 
world history to be a rational progress. On the other hand but, he also posits that history 
is controlled by a Providence.120 Moreover, elsewhere he identifies God with reason and 
suggests; 
This good, this Reason, in its most concrete form, is God. God 
governs the world; the actual working of his government- carrying out 
of his plan – is the history of world. This plan philosophy tries to 
comprehend.121  
 
 Moreover, essence of god is freedom. His purpose is nothing other than his own will and 
the nature of his will is freedom. Will is free when only it does not will anything alien, 
foreign to itself, but wills itself alone, when it does not depend on anything but itself. 122 
Indeed, both Taylor and Pippin argues that Hegel’s conception of freedom is a specific 
from of the understanding of freedom as rational self-determination and belongs to the 
tradition of Rousseau, Kant, and Fichte. On this view, freedom is realized when the 
subject acts on not on what is merely given but on his own reasons.123 The whole history 
of world has the sole aim of realization of freedom in concrete.124  What is striking here 
is Hegel’s easy switch between religious and secular discourses. His description of 
history can be understood only in secular terms, as a progress of human rationality and 
freedom. At the end of this historical activity, human beings become conscious of 
themselves as historically self-productive and self-determining agents, building their own 
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world freely.125  But, it is also equally possible to read this, as the divine plan of 
Providence towards self-actualization whose culmination is modern state. Hegel does not 
choose purely secular discourse over a religious one, or vice versa.  What is more, he 
transforms and translates them into each other in his entire philosophical project. This 
attempt of reconciliation is what Hegel can still offer, apart from his left / right critics 
and heirs. In a different context Thomas Lewis takes the fundamental strategy of Hegel 
to be the reconciliation of tradition with freedom.126. Moreover, there is no binary 
opposition between reason and faith in Hegel’s thought, both include truth as their 
content, but philosophy based on thought is a more adequate form of expression.127 The 
real existence of this truth; unity of subjective and universal will on earth is state for 
Hegel. The state is the objective existence of freedom on the world. It is the unity of 
rational will with the subjective will of humans which are in turn means in realizing this 
activity of God. 128 He defines state as follows; 
  This essential being is the union of the subjective with the rational 
will: It is the moral Whole, the State, which is the form of reality in 
which the individual has and enjoys his freedom, but on the condition 
of his recognizing, believing in, and willing that which is common to 
the whole. 129  
   
 
 This state issues from Christianity.130  Hegel’s argument which claims that religion is at 
the foundation of state131 can be understood both historically and metaphysically. 
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Indeed whole history is the development of subjective freedom which first emerges in 
Christianity and then gives rise to modern state, the nature of which is explored in his 
political philosophy. Not only the dialectic in history but also the one in his Lectures on 
Philosophy of Religion comes to a parallel conclusion; religion gives rise to Sittlichkeit 
(Ethical Life)132 This can be understood as Joachim Ritter has once rightly noted that 
Christianity has only a historical function of mediating the transition from Greek 
freedom to modern freedom, although Ritter himself does not think this to be the case in 
Hegel.133  Whether Ethical Life wholly replaces religion or not, will be discussed in the 
fourth chapter of this thesis.  But beyond history, Hegel also claims in abstraction that 
the foundation of religion and state are one and the same. 134 The second argument, I 
call metaphysical argument. It is therefore necessary to investigate whether Christian 
religion has finished its historical function and gave rise to Ethical Life or the unity that 
he finds in both religion and state is institutionalized in Ethical Life. I will first start 
from his analysis of history as the realization of subjective freedom that first emerges in 
Christianity. Christianity is comprehended as the religion of freedom as in his earlier 
writings. But the nature of the state that emerges out of the dialectics of history is not 
grasped as coercive anymore.  
 
 
 3. 2. State; Realization of Christian Principle 
 To start, the consciousness of freedom first emerges among the Greeks and 
Romans but their consciousness of freedom was limited. Hegel, unlike his earlier 
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position, is now aware of the institution of slavery in Ancient Greece and Rome; hence 
they are not appreciated anymore as ideally perfect, free societies. In Greece and Rome 
only some were free. But it is with the introduction of Christianity that man as man 
comes to be understood as essentially free, for Hegel. Under Christianity, man has 
infinite value as the subject of God’s grace regardless of his birth and country. Second 
principle, is that of independent subjectivity that comes with Christianity. Greek 
unreflected morality can not sustain itself against subjective freedom. Socrates has been 
killed by Athenian democracy. Subjective principle is the soil on which the truth grows 
for Hegel. Man is no longer dependent on divine but is in unity with it in love. Hegel 
merges these two principles, defines them as the principle of freedom and argues that 
they are won by Christian religion for the secular state. But realization of this principle 
is a long process.135 He states that 
This consciousness first arose in religion, the inmost region of spirit; 
but to introduce the principle into the various relations of the actual 
world involves a more extensive problem then its simple 
implementation; a problem whose solution and application require a 
severe and lengthened process of culture. In proof of this we may note 
that slavery did not cease immediately on the reception of 
Christianity. Still less did liberty predominate in States; or 
Governments and Constitutions adopt a rational organization, or to 
recognize freedom as their basis.136 
 
Thus, freedom emerges first at Christian religion. Then after the long labor of Spirit, it 
becomes the basis of state, tells Hegel. This freedom of subjectivity was lacking in 
Greek Spirit, their unity was natural and unreflective. An element of it, Hegel finds 
among Romans, which later in Philosophy of Right, he will call it personality. Indeed 
Roman world recognize the principle of personality, entitled only to possession 
whereas the emperor as Person of Persons possess all the individuals and thus the right 
to possession also loose its validity under this condition of domination.  
Secondly the unity of God with man in the person of Jesus appears in Christian 
religion. This does not mean that god appears as man alone, asserts Hegel. But man as 
man, can elevate to the level of God if he annuls what is merely natural in him. 137. The 
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principle of unity of God with man that first appears immediately in the person of Jesus 
had to be realized for the whole humanity in the history. The first form of this unity 
apart from Jesus, Hegel finds in the early community of love, parallel to his position in 
Christianity and its Fate. It is in the community that unity of God and man appears 
first.138  Although, a form of reconciliation with God, the early community is limited 
since reconciliation is achieved in abstraction from the world, in a monkish withdrawal 
from it.139 This community found itself in Roman world and at first kept itself apart 
from the state, did not react against it. But when it was secluded from the state and did 
not recognize its emperor as the absolute sovereign, Christian community became the 
target of hate and persecution. This alienation of community was mentioned in Hegel’s 
early writings, but he did not envisage that out of its principle, there will grow a state 
which is based on freedom. This does not take place during the Roman Empire. Under 
the Roman Empire, the theoretical aspect of religion; the dogma has been developed 
and church turned into a particular form of secular existence parallel to other secular 
institutions. In its early form, church was a perfect democracy of the spiritual 
community but during middle ages, it degenerated into an aristocracy. 140 Hegel is still 
critical about church, just as in his earlier writings. But this time he sees corruption of 
church as a necessary moment in the history.141 The actors of the realization of freedom 
on earth would be Germanic people. There is nothing chauvinistic as both Avineri and 
Taylor remarked about Hegel’s trust on Germanic people. Indeed, Taylor suggests that 
Hegel means by Germanic the barbarians who invaded Roman Empire. Montesquieu 
also pointed out that modern European polities had their origin in Germanic barbarian 
kingdoms.142 Furthermore, Avineri makes it clear that Hegel’s use of Germanic 
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includes France, Italy, Spain, England etc. 143 but before coming to that epoch of 
Germanic people; it is also necessary to refer Hegel’s interpretation of Byzantine 
Empire. Under Constantine the Great, Christianity becomes the state religion. Hegel 
does not appreciate the Byzantine since the real principle of Christianity was not 
activated there. Accordingly, the organization of state, its laws was not harmonized 
with that principle.144  The Germanic people only after Reformation will make this 
principle true. Hegel talks about the mission of Germanic people as follows; 
The destiny of Germanic people is, to be the bearers of the Christian 
principle. The principle of Spiritual Freedom – of Reconciliation [of 
the Objective and Subjective], was introduced into the simple, 
uninformed minds of those peoples; and the part assigned to them in 
the Service of the World – Spirit was that of not possessing the Idea 
of Freedom as the Substratum of their religious conceptions, but of 
producing it in free and spontaneous development from their 
subjective self consciousness. 145 
 
The Germanic world is divided into three periods and what characterizes this world is 
the antithesis of the church and state, and neither of them is founded on the principle of 
freedom.  The first epoch which he calls the period of Father, start with the appearance 
of German nations in the Roman Empire and extend to reign of Charlemagne. This 
period is simply characterized as immediate unity of Christendom which has secular 
and spiritual aspect.146  
The real antithesis between church and state appears in the second period; that of Son, 
starts with early middle ages and extends until the time of Charles V’s reign. This is the 
second attempt of reconciliation with world, but it could not be realized, humanity is 
still not at home in the world. Quoting from Hegel; 
Worldliness and religiosity remains external to each other. But they 
had to enter relation all the same. Hence the relation in which they 
stand can itself only be an external one, or more precisely, a relation 
in which one prevails over the other, and thus there is no 
reconciliation at all. The religious it is felt, should be the dominant 
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element: what is reconciled, the church ought to prevail over what is 
unreconciled, the worldly realm.147  
  
He describes the church in this period as a theocracy and state appears as a feudal 
monarchy. The theocracy of church is just the opposite of Christian freedom. It is 
characterized by harsh bondage and decline into every kind of externality and 
worldliness, for Hegel. Indeed, the doctrines of Christianity was firmly settled by 
Councils of Church and one of the essential feature of that doctrines is the recognition 
of divine nature with the unity of human nature. But external realization of the unity of 
divine with human, the presence of Christ in world has been done in a sensuous form, 
in miraculous images, places and times. 148Catholicism is a form of idolatry, for Hegel. 
God in Catholicism, as Paul Lakeland has indicated, is a bad infinite of Hegel; which 
has no relation with the finite, and which in turn is reduced to finite. Moreover God 
here stand in opposition to real human world and appears alien to it.149 The medieval 
state on the other hand, is full of contradictions, tells Hegel.  On the one side there is an 
empty imperial rule, constituting the secular arm of church; on the other side there is 
the bond of fidelity which for Hegel is the most unfaithful bondage depending on the 
arbitrary choice of man’s disposition not on the authority of right and law. Both church 
and state in the second period of Germanic world is founded on the opposite of 
Christian principle of freedom. It is only in the third period; the period of Spirit, that 
this antithesis is reversed. Indeed, in the third period, which starts with reformation and 
extends to French Revolution and Hegel’s own time, the principle of freedom will 
become the foundation of secular state. Secular existence for Hegel started to 
understand its own intrinsic value and independent validity in the third epoch. The 
centralization and rationalization under the absolute monarchy is an advantage over 
feudalism for Hegel because capricious will of the individuals is subordinated to the 
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common interest of whole.150  In Monarch he says; “…there is one lord and no serf, for 
servitude is abrogated by it, and in it Right and Law are recognized; it is the source of 
real freedom.’’151 Moreover vassals become officers of state and individuals quitted 
their individual capacity and become members of estates and corporations. Hegel tells 
that monarch can no longer rule by arbitrary will. He has to get consent of various 
estates and corporations for the maintenance of his rule.  For Hegel, there is a 
constitution of various orders of estates and corporations in modern monarchy and this 
is the advantage of it over the feudal rule which does not recognize such orders. 152  
Reformation as the second world historical event of this era resulted from the 
corruption of church, which abused its power and recognized deity only in sensuous 
externality according to Hegel. Luther’s doctrine but, took deity in its true spirituality 
and purified Christian principle. Secondly, by setting up the authority of bible and 
testimony of human spirit against the authority of church, Luther cancelled the 
distinction between laymen and priests. The possession of the truth is no longer in the 
hands of one class but belongs to whole mankind, says Hegel. Thus, for Hegel the 
Christian freedom started to be actualized. But this subjective side of feeling must also 
be reconciled with the objective side of truth. In fact law, property, government etc. 
must be conformed to this principle of freedom.153 By replacing the monastic vows of 
chastity, poverty and obedience, Luther affirmed the spheres of Hegel’s Ethical Life 
(Sittlichkeit) and so the participation in familiar, economic and political institutions of 
modern society.  As Merold Westphal has noticed, what is central in Hegel’s 
interpretation of Protestantism is repudiation of 3 monastic vows; its worldliness, 
whereas most of the understandings of Protestantism takes justification by faith alone 
as decisive.154  
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Repudiation of three monastic vows in turn opens the possibility for the 
acknowledgement of worldly realm as divine. Indeed, Hegel argues that; 
The harmony [of Objective and Subjective Will] which has resulted 
from the painful struggles of History, involves the recognition of the 
Secular as capable of being an embodiment of Truth: whereas it had 
formerly been regarded as evil only, as incapable of Good – the latter 
being considered essentially ultra mundane. It is now perceived that 
Morality and Justice in the State are also divine and commanded by 
God, and that in the point of substance there is nothing higher or more 
sacred.155    
 
Therefore, the result of history is an idea of state which is divine. Similarly, in 
Philosophy of Religion Hegel mentions the last phase of the dialectic of religion to be 
Ethical Life of which state is a part. 156 This might be understood as religion is 
transformed into the cult of Ethical Life. This argument gains support when absence of 
religion as one of the central institutions of Ethical Life is considered.  But this is not 
the argument that Hegel wants to pursue. Apart from claiming that religion leads to 
Ethical Life historically, so reconcile Christian subject with worldly political social 
existence in an entirely secular but spiritual life, Hegel also wants religion not to 
disappear but to be the very foundation of state. Moreover, he affirms that; 
…the state, on the other hand, regulated by the selfsame reason, is a 
temple of Human freedom concerned with the perception and 
volition of a reality, whose purport may itself be called divine. Thus 
freedom in the State is only the carrying out of that which 
constitutes the fundamental principle of Religion. The process 
displayed in History is only the manifestation of Religion as Human 
Reason- the production of the religious principle which dwells in the 
hearth of man, under the form of Secular Freedom. Thus discord 
between the inner hearth and the actual world is removed. 157 
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Furthermore, France tried to realize the principle of freedom in abstraction from 
religion. But this can not happen according to Hegel. There can be no revolution 
without reformation. 158 Indeed post-French Revolution is still alienating since, there is 
opposition between an unfree church and state founded on abstract freedom. French 
Revolution reflects the limited understanding of Enlightenment. Enlightenment has an 
abstract and undeveloped idea of pure Reason, says Hegel. It takes religion to be its 
adversary and can not relate itself to the absolute substance of universe. In Germany on 
the other hand, enlightenment was conducted in the interest of theology. Reformation 
reconciled worldly realm with religion, the principle which would result in the further 
development of equity in political sphere was already present.159  In this context of 
criticizing France, Hegel asserts foundation of state to be religion; this argument is the 
topic of next section that necessitates detailed analysis.   
 
                     
 3. 3.  Unity of Religion and State  
 
The argument which asserts religion to be the foundation of state is related to 
Hegel’s specific understanding of the character of people; the Volksgeist (Spirit of 
People). For him religion is the most important factor in shaping the conscience of 
communities. Read in this light, I argue the legitimacy of state does not come from God 
but from the conviction of people. In other words there should not be opposition 
between the conviction of people and political constitution, which will bring alienation. 
There is nothing theocratic about Hegel’s understanding of state. But apart from this, 
Hegel also supports this argument at metaphysical level by claiming that the content of 
both religion and idea of state is truth and freedom. This argument again, apart from 
being a plea for fundamentalism, is an attempt of a search for reconciliation between 
purely secular and religious minds. Not thinking religion as philosophically false, Hegel 
appears tolerant in recognizing the plural expressions of the same truth, at the level of 
consciousness. But in his practical philosophy, he asserts that not the unity of content 
but difference of form should be the principle, religion and state are to be separated.  In 
both Voksgeist and metaphysical arguments; neither dogma nor other authorities of 
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religion has been emphasized. Instead the people’s convictions and abstract truth of 
religion are taken as decisive by Hegel.   
To start, religion for Hegel is the sphere in which a nation gives itself its own 
conception of truth. He claims that the conception of God; the truth, constitutes the 
general character of people.160 Accordingly, it is impossible to design a political 
constitution without taking into consideration the general character of people which is 
mostly shaped by their religion. He argues that ‘A people which had a bad conception 
of God also had a bad state, a bad government and bad laws.’161 Therefore, the starting 
point of inquiry for determining the general character of people would be the content of 
their religion. For Hegel, religion which has the genuine truth in its content is the one 
which recognizes God in its unity with human actualities. Religion which considers the 
truth; God, to be separate from world, and which does not see the real and positive 
existence in the idea of incarnation has a superstitious form. The target of Hegel as a 
committed Lutheran is again Catholicism. Catholicism, although has in it the true 
content; God, it represent it in sensuous forms but not as spirit. Therefore under 
Catholicism no rational constitution is possible, for Hegel. In Catholic world, the holy 
and non holy is strictly separated.162 Indeed, the holy in Catholicism is bestowed on 
external objects, times and places. Prayer is directed towards images and miracles are 
expected from them. It leads to justification by external works but in these works the 
very meaning of spirit is misconceived and law, justice, morality are corrupted.163  
Moreover he claims that; 
Along with the principle of spiritual bondage, and these applications 
of it in the religious life, there can only go in the legislative and 
constitutional system a legal and moral bondage, and a state of 
lawlessness and immorality in political life.164  
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Against the argument that Catholicism guarantees the stability in governments, he 
proposes that this can only apply to governments which have the spiritual bondage at 
the basis of their institutions but not legal and moral freedom.165 Furthermore, 
Catholicism claims exclusive control of human activity, it can impose precepts opposed 
to worldly rationality. If the subjective freedom becomes the basis of state, Catholic 
religion will stand necessarily in opposition to it. This is what happened in France after 
the revolution, for Hegel. Catholicism demands unconditional submission to the church 
and renunciation of all freedom. In France, who adheres to the principle of secular 
freedom, necessarily ceases to belong to Catholic religion.166  Revolution in France 
could not realize the emancipation that it promised, since it was based on abstract 
understanding of freedom and people’s character was shaped by Catholic Religion. In 
short, revolutionaries attempted to bring right and freedom in a condition of oppressive 
religion. Hegel argues that such a project is doomed to failure; 
 Thus liberalism as an abstraction, emanating from France, traversed 
the Roman World; but Religious slavery held that world in the fetters 
of political servitude. For it is a false principle that the fetters which 
bind Right and Freedom can be broken without the emancipation of 
conscience – that there can be a Revolution without a Reformation.167  
 
Therefore a free state and a slavish religion are not compatible. The prerequisite of 
building a political system on freedom and rights is reforming the religion. Trying to 
separate these spheres and assuming that they can be maintained in their separation 
peacefully is an impossible mission for Hegel. Indeed it is self deception to expect that 
individuals will follow law but not spirit of their religion which shapes their inner 
conscience and determines their obligation.168 The religious conviction of individuals 
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determines their outlook on political constitution. Modern consideration of them as 
separate is, one-sided and inadequate understanding for Hegel. He asserts that; 
 
These two aspects, conviction and the formal constitution, are 
inseparable and can not do without one another. But modern times 
have seen the emergence of that one-sidedness whereby the 
constitution is supposed to be self-supporting on the one hand, while 
the other conviction, religion, and conscience are to be set as 
irrelevant on the grounds that whatever conviction and religion 
individuals may subscribe to have nothing to do with political 
constitution.169  
  
As.Merold Westphal suggests that, in this context Hegel tends to identify religion with 
Volksgeist rather than treating it as one of its expression. But his holism requires, more 
than Hegel himself notices, to adopt also the materialist historical position. In his 
holistic logic, there is no distinction between independent and dependent variables, 
remarks Westphal. Therefore it is not contrary to Hegel’s own position to argue that 
there can be no reformation without a political and economic revolution.170 Hegel in his 
Positivity Essay did in fact adopt such a materialistic explanation of the emergence of 
Christianity, as had been analyzed in the first chapter of this thesis. However, in his late 
period, his vision seemed to be more akin to idealists.  
Thus freedom in the state is preserved and established by religion, 
since moral rectitude in the State is only the carrying out of that which 
constitutes the fundamental principle of Religion. The process 
displayed in History is only the manifestation of Religion as Human 
Reason – the production of religious principle which dwells in the 
hearth of man, under the form of Secular Freedom. Thus the discord 
between the inner life of the heart and the actual world is removed.171  
 
The religion that he talks in abstraction is Protestantism, since only after the reformation 
that the two fold division between the inner life of the hearth and actual world is 
overcome. It is through reformation that divine spirit introduces itself in actuality. In 
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Protestantism, the conviction of people gives rise to free constitution since it values the 
worldly as spiritual and becoming capable of moral. In fact, Roman Catholic Church 
previously valued that unmarried state as holier than having a family.172 Marriage of 
priests after Luther further removes the distinction between laity and clergy; spiritual and 
worldly.173 The Roman Catholic Church also took poverty to be a sacred virtue, and 
declared the socioeconomic sphere as unholy. The Roman Catholic Church does not 
value man’s productivity and honest administration of property as a means for sustaining 
life and helping others. This condemnation of work and acquisition of wealth did only 
resulted in enrichment of clergy, says Hegel.174  After the reformation; industry, crafts 
and trades has been recognized as having the moral validity. The third sanctity of Roman 
Catholic Church; the blind obedience has also be rejected and instead the obedience to 
the laws of state was made the principle of action. For Hegel in the obedience to state 
man is free since subjection that is required from him is a free allegiance; to yield the 
particular for the General.175 This idea which claims that obedience to state is also divine 
reveals the ideological character of religion which can legitimize any unjust and 
tyrannical action of state over its subjects. Popper attacks Hegel on this point and asserts 
that Hegel wants us to worship the state, for him individual is nothing and state is 
everything.176 Moreover, Marx in a different context suggested; “where as under 
Protestantism, there is no supreme head of the church, the rule of religion is nothing but 
the religion of rule, the cult of governments’ will.’’ However in the same article Marx 
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mentions Hegel as one of the philosophers who regard state through human eyes and not 
theology.177 On the other hand there are also softer readings of this argument. Indeed, 
Stephen Houlgate  emphasizing Hegel’s identification of religion with spirit of people 
comments that state’s laws must be recognized by faith otherwise not having roots in the 
hearts of people, laws of state appears as a superstructure which are at odds with people’s 
convictions. 178 Moreover, James Doull, comments that if religion denies its common 
point with worldly wisdom it becomes worldlier, and similarly when secularism denies 
its common root with religion, it becomes more religious.179  Merold Westphall’s 
interpretation, not distinguishing state from the general framework of Ethical Life, offers 
that by that argument Hegel means social bonds are sacred as opposed the bonds of 
calculated self interest.180 Critics have right in their claims whereas arguments of 
proponents are equally plausible. However, it is necessary to highlight that Hegel himself 
is aware of the tyrannical implications of his argument and asserts that; 
Now if you say that, the state must be grounded on religion you may 
mean that it should rest on rationality and arise out of it; but your 
statement may also be misunderstood to mean that man are most 
adroitly schooled to obedience if their minds are shacked by a slavish 
religion. (Christian religion however is the religion of freedom, 
thought it must be admitted that this religion may become changed in 
character and perverted from freedom to the bondage…)181  
 
It is clear that, above Hegel refers to Catholicism. But he also recognizes the same 
danger of tyranny that will result of his proposition of the unity of state and religion in 
Protestant countries, in which this unity is already present. In Hegel’s words;  
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  Expressed formally, the proposition thus runs as follows; one ought 
to obey laws, whatever they may be. In this way governing and 
legislation are left to arbitrary will of the government. This situation 
arise in Protestant states, and it is only in such states  that it can occur 
, for in them only the unity of religion and state [already referred to] is 
present…But if we go no further than formal proposition, the way is 
left open for arbitrariness, tyranny and oppression.182  
 
Hegel thinks such an arbitrary rule appeared in England during the last king of House of 
Stuarts in which the king believed that he was divinely ordained. Under Protestantism 
says Hegel there is no distinction between layman and priests and it is equally 
contradictory that one layman have such a privileged status.183  Moreover, in his 
Philosophy of Right, his attack on von Haller against identification of the right of the 
might with divine law makes it clear that force has no divine origin. (PR, § 158) This has 
been considered as one of the points of his deviation from restoration Prussia. In fact, as 
Kenneth Westphall has indicated, Karl Ludwig von Haller was one of the leading 
intellectual figures of the restoration period.184  
Moreover, Walter Ullman suggests that emergence of European political theory 
was formed by contact between ascending and descending principles of Kingship. 
According to ascending theory, power ascends from community. On the other hand, 
stands the approach which takes power to be descending from God.185 I argue that, 
Hegel’s theory is more close to ascending theory, since God ascends to community and 
appears in various Volksgeists in history.  
 Lastly, as Hegel’s unity of religion and state rejects implication of divine right of 
kings, it equally rules out the establishment of state religion. Comparing Hegel’s position 
with that of Hobbes will be more illuminating here. Indeed Hobbes in the establishment 
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of his Leviathan rejects descending theory of authority in which right to rule comes from 
God to sovereign. Different than Hegel but, his state is established on contract. Hobbes 
ideal is a protestant state in which sovereign is also head of the church in both secular 
and religious matters.186 Hegel on the other hand as will be seen, does not institutionalize 
the unity of religion and state by positing Protestantism as a state religion. Toleration 
appears an indispensible part of freedom in Philosophy of Right.  
Last point that necessitates emphasis is the metaphysical dimension of unity of 
state and religion. This argument, I suggest is much related to Hegel’s understanding of 
truth. Indeed a speculative truth for Hegel is the unity in difference; synthesis of 
subjective/objective, particular/universal To express it is very difficult by one sided 
proposition.187 All religions, in spite of his dislike for Catholicism and to some extend 
criticism of Judaism, appear as including the truth in his thought.188 But they differ in 
their forms of expressing this truth. Peddle argues that, modern state in Hegel is not 
conceived as freed from the particularities of all religion but it has its grounds in the 
underlying principle of all religions 189 On the other hand but, religion represents its truth 
in the form of feeling and representation. It is only philosophy that adequately expresses 
truth of religion by transforming the representative form of it into concepts.190 But this 
does not alter the true content of religion.  This toleration for multiple expressions of the 
same content of truth makes Hegel still an appealing thinker. Similarly both state and 
religion have the same content of truth. Moreover he argues that; 
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In general, religion and foundation of the state is one and the same 
thing – they are identical in and for themselves. In the patriarchal 
condition and the Jewish theocracy, the two are not yet distinct and 
still outwardly identical. Nevertheless the two are also different, and 
in due course, they become strictly separated from one another; but 
they are once more posited as genuinely identical…Religion is the 
highest knowledge of truth, and this truth, defined more precisely, is 
free spirit…The state is merely freedom in the world, in 
actuality…there is one conception of freedom in [both] religion and 
the state.191  
 
Thus, both state and religion have the same content of truth. Truth means for Hegel the 
mutual adequacy of subject to object.192  Although each finite being tries to realize this 
adequacy, they can become the expression of truth in a limited way. Truth can be only 
the whole then, not a value attributed to logical propositions but an ontological 
concept. The realization of adequacy of subject to object is a historical process in 
Hegel’s philosophy. Truth which is adequately realized in history is God for Hegel. 
Moreover, Hegel notes that freedom has the same definition as that of truth: unity of 
subject with the object.193 In such a unity, there is an identity between subject and 
object. In entering the determination of the objective, subject is reconciled with the 
object and is determined still by itself since subject realizes in this process that object is 
not something totally alien to itself, and thus finds itself in its other. The engagement of 
God with world can be explained in these terms. Religion is the knowledge of this 
highest truth; the God as freedom and state is the actualization of this freedom in the 
world.194 Their forms of expression this truth differs yet. Relying on this distinction of 
form, Hegel posits the institutional separation of religion and state. But conceived at 
metaphysical level, they are united. The analysis of this formal separation is the topic 
of the next chapter, which is described in the long remark of paragraph 270 of 
Philosophy of Right. But apart from that paragraph, religion is hardly mentioned in his 
account of system of right and this need to be emphasized firstly. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
 
 
 
RELIGION IN STATE 
 4. 1. System of Right in General and Religion 
 The most elaborate account of Hegel’s mature political thought is found in his 
Philosophy of Right (1821) and a brief synopsis is also presented in his Encyclopedia 
(1817, Heidelberg 1817, rev. Berlin 1827, 1830).  What is striking about arguments and 
proposals conferred in Philosophy of Right (PR) is their very limited if not absent 
appeal to religion, compared to his other works.  Walter Jaeschke while considering the 
implications of this absence of religion in PR, concludes that state appears in this work 
of Hegel self-justified and does not need religion.  However, according to Jaeschke, in 
the Encyclopedia of 1830, Hegel modifies his understanding of the relationship between 
religion and state, corrects the position of PR and this unity of religion and ethical life 
proposed in paragraph 552 of Encyclopedia is the last word of Hegel on this issue.195 It 
is necessary to cast doubt on the idea which expresses that separation of religion and 
state is incompatible with some higher abstract level unity. In my opinion Hegel holds 
both of these views, and what he does in Encyclopedia is not modification of his 
position, since in PR the  model of separation of religion and state is not the separation 
of opposites but a type of unity in difference. On the other hand, but, institutions of 
Right are almost purely secular institutions, the dialectic here shows that, it is possible 
to sustain system without appeal to religion. But this does not mean that they are 
antithesis of religion, on the contrary they are the very realization of the principle of 
Christian freedom, for Hegel. I will first attempt to show that the religious foundation of 
right is not institutionalized in Hegel’s system of right, and then proceed to analyze the 
model of separation of religion and state as posited in PR.  
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To start, Right (Recht) for Hegel is the existence of free will. He takes the term in 
a comprehensive sense not merely in the limited usage of juristic law but as the actual 
conditions of freedom.196 Indeed, as Knox makes it clear, the Recht includes not only 
civil law but also morality, ethical life and world history. 197 Ethical life in turn, is the 
commonly used translation of Sittlichkeit. Other translations include objective ethics, 
concrete ethics. But as Charles Taylor has noted, no translation can adequately capture 
the meaning of this term. It refers to moral obligations that a person has to a community 
in which he is a part of. These obligations are established on norms and uses of 
community.198 The institutions of ethical life appear as family, civil society and state.  
In PR, he start from the abstract concept of free will which wills only itself and 
proceeds dialectically to more concrete and adequate forms of expression of this free 
will namely; abstract right, morality and ethical life. In turn, individual appears as 
bearer of right, moral subject, family member, burgher and citizen but not as believer or 
church member, if we skip the long remark of paragraph 270. 
        
 
4.1.1 Abstract Right and Religion   
         
Abstract right is the first mode of the free will. It includes institutions of 
personality, property, contract, wrong and punishment. It is abstract and has a negative 
attitude to reality. (PR, §34) Any content is a limitation to it. Staying at this level only 
will bring a fanaticism; French Revolution is the political example of this abstract level. 
Any differentiation of talent or authority or appears as a limit to abstract right, and it 
have tendency to destroy these limits. (PR, §5A) Nevertheless, the individual, as the 
possessor of abstract right appears as person. (PR, §35) The personality involves 
capacity for rights. (PR, §36) This is the sphere of liberty, life, property.  As Franco has 
asserted, Hegel recognize the importance of fundamental rights and freedoms which are 
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at the core of liberal theory. But he reveals the incompleteness of them.  Moreover he 
does not take basis of these rights to be any natural or divine right but, recognition of 
others. Abstract right is the sphere of legal personality and is distinguished from moral 
subjectivity.199 The defect of the level is this; recognition in the contract arises out of 
arbitrary will, but not moral will. Will is common but not universal between the 
contracting parties. (PR, §75) The importance of this level for this thesis lies in the fact 
that Hegel does not derive rights from a divine source but takes the basis of them to be 
recognition. 
            
               
4. 1. 2. Morality and Religion 
             
Morality is the second level in the system of Right. It is will, reflected into itself. 
The free individual is characterized as subject, it turns into itself, internalize its will; and 
appears as a particular will.200 Subject is moral agent who has responsibility and a 
distinctive conception of good and welfare of its own. Morality is related to 
determination of our lives and satisfaction we got in our choices.201  Although a higher 
ground than abstract right, this level has certain defects. Indeed, subject is conscious of 
universality as something different from subjectivity. It does not achieve concrete 
synthesis of universality and subjectivity. It therefore remains at the level of ought, 
always a demand. (PR, §108) Kant’s criticism is present in PR too. Absence of 
contradiction as a criterion for determining our duty does not prove a genuine criteria, 
for Hegel. Kant believed in that certain type of action for example, breaking promises or 
telling lies can be rejected a priori as moral maxims. Trying to universalize these type of 
actions will involve an contradiction. Kant, as Michael Inwood has also noticed, 
oversimplifies Kant’s position and claims that by the criterion of absence of 
contradiction, practical reason can not go beyond abstract formalism of theoretical 
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reason.202 For Hegel, if there is a contradiction, it must be a contradiction of some 
content which is already presupposed from the start. Kantian categorical imperative 
remains abstract, there is no criterion to decide whether a principle is duty or not, so any 
wrong can be justified. (PR, §135R) Moreover, whether the conscience of individual 
corresponds to what is good can be known only when we know the content of good. 
This content is provided by ethical life.203 (PR, $ 137) Hegel has reversed his early 
position which sees any contend coming out of individual as detrimental to autonomy.  
Secondly, Kenneth Westphall interprets the divinity of state in Hegel, by 
appealing to divine tasks that Kant attributes to God. Indeed, for Kant, following one’s 
inclinations brings happiness. But whether our inclinations will correspond to our duty 
is a matter of chance, and happiness is a gift of divine grace. Hegel’s state by providing 
a rational framework of action can provide this knowledge and so happiness becomes a 
real possibility to be achieved in this world, not a matter of divine grace.204 Robert 
Pippin similarly approaches to this issue from Kant’s postulates of practical reason; 
existence of God and immortality of soul. These had to be assumed in Kant for the 
possibility of achievement happiness along with moral righteousness. Hegel does not 
need these assumptions of god and immortal soul, in his emphasize on the role of 
ethical community at the formation of individuals. For Pippin, both Kant and Hegel 
believe that we are subjected to laws that we are the author. But in Hegel authorship of 
law and self subjection to it, is collective, gradual and historical. 205 
Moreover, having a conscience is a modern phenomenon, says Hegel. But to have 
conscience means to have a capacity for evil (PR, §139) Morality is only a formal 
conscience and to determine what is right and good is not the property of individual. 
Ethical life is the true conscience which in turn unites formal subjective will with 
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universal in a concrete way. Moreover he adds that feeling is not the true form of it (PR, 
§137). By arguing in that way, he implicitly disregards religious conscience which has 
the form of feeling. So, in turn suggest that religion can not be a source for law and 
right. But this does not mean that religious conscience will be totally disregarded in 
Ethical Life. As Frederick Neuhauser emphasized, Hegel’s attitude towards 
conscientious dissenters such as Jews, Quakers and Mennonites is quite liberal.206 
Hegel’s understanding of toleration will be covered in the next section, it is sufficient to 
mention here that, Hegel’s system has a room for religious conscience, but true 
conscience is not identical with religious conscience, in the form of feeling. Hegel, 
unlike his early position does not identify religion with morality or consider religion to 
be above morality in PR.   
 
             
4. 1. 3 Family and Religion  
         
Ethical life says Hegel; “…is the concept of freedom developed into the existing 
world and the nature of self consciousness. On the other hand, it is the good become 
alive’’ (PR, $. 142) The substance of ethical life; these laws and institutions are duties 
binding on the will of individual. (PR, §148) The bond of duty can appear as a 
restriction only on indeterminate subjectivity. Quoting from Hegel; 
…that in duty the individual finds his liberation form; first liberation 
from dependence on mere natural impulse and from the depression 
which as a particular subject he can not escape in his moral reflections 
on what ought to be and what might be; secondly, liberation from the 
indeterminate subjectivity which never reaching reality.. remains self 
enclosed. In duty the individual acquires his substantive freedom.  
(PR, §149) 
 
Thus, individuals find liberation in Ethical Life for Hegel. Family is the most 
immediate and primitive form of Ethical Life in Hegel. It is characterized by love, 
which is mind’s feeling of its unity. Its members achieve self consciousness not as 
independent persons but as members. (PR, §158) Early Hegel characterized love with 
the spirit of Jesus and his community. But here love seems to be restricted to the sphere 
family. He argues that in the state love disappears, and unity is achieved through law, 
the content of which must be rational and known to us. (PR, §158A) The duty of 
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education of children is bestowed upon parents and he does not mention church or 
religious education as necessary for the moral development of children. (PR,  § 174)  
Family is dissolved when children grows and becomes self-subsistent individuals of 
civil society. (PR, §181) 
               
               
 4. 1. 4. Civil Society and Religion 
               
 Civil society, second moment of Ethical Life, is a complex arrangement which 
includes a market economy and civic sphere of corporations. Moreover, Hegel also 
locates coercive institutions of state; administration of justice, police, law in civil 
society. (PR §188) Civil society appears as an external state based on need (Notstaad) 
For Hegel, civil society is in constant need of state control and supervision.207 Alan 
Wood argues that, Hegel does not deny coercive functions of state, but he assigns them 
to Notstaad. In other words state appear as coercive from the self-interested perspective 
of individuals.208 
Individual, who has needs, wants and a capacity for satisfying them through his 
own labor, is dependent upon the labor of others. The system of needs in civil society is 
a complex system of interdependence in which individual finds satisfaction by means of 
others. (PR, §182) Individuals in their capacity as burghers are modern interest-seeking 
private persons. (PR, § 187) The interest of individual can not be defined simply as 
natural needs. As a reflective being, man has capacity of multiplication of needs and 
means of satisfying them. (PR, § 191)Hegel reads this as a kind of liberation from mere 
natural existence, but it remains abstract since its content remains in particularity of 
self-interest. (PR, §194 § 195) Moreover, multiplication of needs and means of 
satisfying them subdivides production and brings division of labor and which in turn 
creates class distinctions. (PR, §198, §199) The division of classes reproduces the 
inequality by nature and transforms it into an inequality of mind, skills, and even moral 
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and intellectual development. (PR, § 200) There are three classes in Hegel’s system; 
substantial agricultural class, reflecting business class and universal class of civil 
servants. (PR, §202) Hegel assigns modes of consciousness and dispositions to these 
material existences. Indeed, agricultural mode of existence requires little reflection on 
the mode of its subsistence and its primary disposition is trust. (PR, § 203) 
Individualistic business class on the other hand has to produce its own livelihood 
through reflection and intelligence. (PR, § 204) Lastly, the class of civil servants has to 
realize the universal interest of the community. (PR, §205).The modern class system is 
distinguished by its recognition of subjective particularity. When it is lost; indeed when 
class positions were assigned by guardians like in Plato’s Republic, or through the 
accident of birth as in ancient Indian caste system, corruption of whole system follows. 
It can either happen like in ancient Greek states and Roman Republic through the 
overthrow of society, or society can preserve itself by force as a religious authority, like 
in ancient Sparta and caste system of India. (PR, § 206R)  However, although modern 
civil society is an improvement, it has its own structural problem of poverty. Poverty, 
says Hegel, deprive people from all the advantages of society.  (PR, § 241) In turn, there 
arises a mass of paupers which has a hostile disposition towards rich, government and 
society. (PR, § 244) For this problem, Hegel can hardly offer a solution. He considers 
direct measures of public authority like providing direct help, offering of jobs, (PR, 
§245) bu, none Hegel considers to be the real solution of the problem. Moreover, as 
Eric Weil has remarked, against the widespread common misunderstanding, Hegel does 
not propose that religion could solve the social question.209 Oppressed can not find 
peace in religion which in turn will block its opposition and hostility towards state.   On 
the contrary, poor has no access to religion as well. Quoting from Hegel, 
 
…their poverty leave them more or less deprived of  all the 
advantages of society, of the opportunity of acquiring skills or 
education of any kind, as well as the administration of justice, the 
public health services, and often even of the consolidation of 
religion and so forth. (PR, § 241)  
 
 Moreover, while searching for consolation in religion, oppressed can find itself in one 
of the harshest bondage, depending on the nature of religion, Hegel remarks. (PR, § 
270R) Charity but as a practical solution, stemming from subjective morality, is 
                                               
209 Eric Weil, Hegel and The State ( The John Hopkins University Press : Baltimore and 
London: 1998), p. 107 
 
 61 
appreciated by Hegel. He takes charity to be the “the place where morality finds plenty 
to do despite all public organization.’’(PR, §242) But it is still a false opinion, for 
Hegel that charitable disposition can be the only solution without universal regulations 
and ordinances which are obligatory. 
 In civil society, particularity prevails over universal interest of whole society. Society 
can not sustain itself, has a problem of poverty, this direct society to search for external 
markets abroad and colonize other societies. (PR, § 248) The unity that is provided by 
public authority is also limited, since it involves separation and merely relative identity 
of controller and controlled. Corporations actualize this unity but they would still 
remain restricted in Hegel’s mind.  
 In Philosophy of Right, there are two conceptions of corporation; one takes it as 
purely economic institutions, based on specific industries and trades.210  The main 
section which discusses the role of corporations in civil society defines corporation in 
this narrow basis. Accordingly, Hegel asserts that; 
A member of civil society is in virtue of his own particular skill becomes a 
member of a Corporation, whose universal  purpose is thus wholly concrete and 
no wider in scope than the purpose involved in business, its proper task and 
interest.  (PR, § 251) 
 
In this understanding of corporation, church can not be involved and it would not be 
wrong to derive that Hegel does not see church as an institution of modern society. 
However, this would not be the case. Indeed, the wider conception of corporation 
emerges only when he discusses the role of corporations in state. In that conception 
church and local authorities are included.211 John Keane, on the basis of this wider 
reading of corporation emphasizes the plural nature of civil society in Hegel’s thought 
and affirms that; 
The burgher class certainly depends on corporations – municipal, 
trade, educational, religious, professional and other state authorized 
forms of collective association – which function as its ‘second 
home’,  as a shelter which protects it from the vicissitudes of life in 
civil society and familiarizes it with a higher level of ethical (or 
public spirited) form of life 212 
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Therefore, the real location of church is in civil society according to wider conception 
corporation. But the context, which Hegel discusses the nature of church is its relation 
with polity, will be the next topic of this chapter.  
 
 
4. 2.  Separation of Religion and State  
 
The philosophical proof of the concept of the state starts from the immediate bond 
of family, which disintegrates into civil society and shows its limitedness and lastly 
proceeds to state and reveals that state is the ground of other phases. In Hegel’s words; 
“It is within the state that family is first developed into civil society, and it is the idea of 
the state which disrupts itself into these two moments.’’ (PR, § 256)  State is defined as 
the actuality of ethical Idea. (PR, §257) It unifies the particular aims of individuals 
under a universal end. (PR, § 261) The universal aim can only be freedom; since he 
grounds his whole system of right on free will and will can only be free when it aims its 
own realization. Accordingly, state is the actuality of concrete freedom. For Hegel, state 
is the highest synthesis of universal will with subjective will and in that sense, it is 
reason on earth. Rationality consists in unity of universal with a single content, unity of 
objective freedom with subjective freedom. (PR, § 258). It is not the case that individual 
can become free without community becoming free. In that condition there will be an 
opposition between individual and community and this will bring alienation. On the 
other hand community can not be said to be free without having the component of 
subjective freedom, the same opposition and thus alienation will arise again. Moreover, 
it is important to note that Hegel’s definition of state does not apply strictly to 
constitution. He distinguishes between strictly political state and state proper. State 
proper as Knox has rightly noted, does not refer only to political constitution, but 
includes the subjective side of whole community together with all moral, legal duties 
and rights. According to Knox; “State proper is the totality of human life, so far is it is 
the chief life of moral beings united in a community by tradition, religion and moral 
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convictions.’’213  State proper as community includes religion and there is church taken 
as a corporation, as previous analysis of corporation has asserted. Therefore, there is 
place for religion and church in Hegel’s system. It is in the long remark to paragraph 
270 Hegel presents his ideas on the relation between the two, which is discussed below.  
To start, Hegel begins by criticizing the romantic and particularly Schlegel’s 
tendency of taking religion to be the foundation of state, as the last word of political 
science on the issue.214 It is metaphysical unity of religion and state that is emphasized 
in PR and argued for formal distinction between them should also be institutionalized 
as separation. Moreover, unity of religion and state is true but a one-sided 
understanding for Hegel. Indeed, what is asserted in the argument can imply that state 
is the realm of worldliness, whereas religion is the domain of infinite. State, as a finite 
institution, can not stand on its own basis but must subordinate itself to the realm of 
infinite.  It is true, that state is essentially finite and worldly, but this does not mean that 
state is not capable of becoming ethical and spiritual. A bad state is a finite state and 
nothing else, but a rational state, says Hegel is infinite, and by being rational only, it is 
divine.( RP, § 270A) Viewing the state as the opposite of religion and elevating 
religion as authority above state will result in alienation. Religious subject either gets 
the attitude of indifference towards civic-political life which is inherently evil for him. 
On the other hand, he can consider it as a limit and adopt a hostile attitude towards 
state, a type of fanaticism. Dallmayr suggests that, in the political context of the 
Restoration period, fanaticism of this kind was an exception, but attitude of inward 
retreat from the world of politics was more prevalent.215 Moreover, James Yerkes 
asserts that problem arises between religion and state since both claims itself to be the 
exclusive embodiment of truth and other as the enemy of truth.216  Hegel, but sees both, 
as embodiments of truth in different forms.  
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Religion is part of higher realm of Absolute Spirit and state is still finite and 
therefore part of Objective Spirit.  Religion together with art and philosophy belongs to 
the higher sphere of Absolute Spirit and grounds the whole ethical realm. In this sense 
religion is ground of state. But this ground should not be made the principle of external 
political arrangement. In Hegel’s words; 
Now if religion is in this way the groundwork which includes ethical 
realm in general, and state’s fundamental nature – divine will – in 
particular, it is at the same time only a groundwork, at this point that 
state and religion begins to diverge.(PR, § 270 R) 
 
 Moreover as a consciousness of Absolute, man can always find in religion freedom 
and satisfaction against the hard facts, disappointments and losses he experienced in 
real world. Religion takes the form of feeling, intuition and representative knowledge. 
It is concentrated on God as the unrestricted principle, and wants everything else to be 
seen in this light. This attitude of mind can generate a form of religious fanaticism.  
Accordingly, like fanaticism in politics, it can regard all governmental, legal orders as 
barriers to its inner life of hearth and as incompatible with infinity. Such a fanaticism 
may destroy all the ethical ties. Therefore, state can not recognize this subjective 
disposition of religion as its authority. If it does, it will acquire an unstable character 
and fall on weakness. Although the content of both religion and state is truth, they have 
different forms of expressing this truth. Religion has the form of feeling, whereas state 
has a universal form based on thought. These differences of forms should be 
externalized; church and state should be separated.   
Church is a corporation located in civil society, as mentioned before. Individuals 
holding common religious views, by forming a church, come under the control of state. 
But there is a limit to state’s intervention. Indeed the conscience and inner life could 
not be a matter of state regulation, for Hegel. But doctrine of church is not simply an 
inward matter; it prescribes parallel rules for ethical life. In that condition the paths of 
church and state will either coincide or diverge. (RP, § 270) Timothy Luther depending 
on this possibility of divergence, which will not be under the case of Protestantism as 
Hegel makes it clear, argues that Hegel’s state is less tolerant and more Protestant.217   
Furthermore, Church may claim absolute authority over the whole ethical life. 
Depending in its absolute content of teaching, it can assume itself to be the sole 
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representative of mind (Geist) Moreover, it may think of itself to be the sole actor and 
state as mere means of attainment non-mental ends. But science, says Hegel, similarly 
may claim for itself the whole intellectual sphere. Indeed, he upholds that; 
The church bases this claim on the wide ground that the whole domain 
of mind (Geist) is its property. But science and all types of knowledge 
also have a footing in that domain and like a church, they build 
themselves into a whole with a guiding principle of its own, and even 
with better justification, may regard themselves as occupying the 
position which the church claims. (PR, § 270R) 
 
State should not allow religion to posses the whole intellectual and ethical realm, for 
Hegel. But it should pay respect to its doctrines and should not attempt to determine 
them.  
Secondly, since church owns a property, practices worship and have people in its 
service; it enters into the domain of state and comes under its laws. State should help 
church in these matters, and provide assistance. Hegel, asserting that religion 
nevertheless is an integrating factor in state, proposes that state should even require all 
its citizens to belong to a church. But state can not determine which church, since 
content of faith belongs to man’s private ideas and state can not interfere with it.  
Moreover, Hegel’s position towards religious minorities is quite tolerant as Dallmayr 
218 Avineri219 and Neuhauser220 have noticed.  Hegel by supporting Quakers and 
Anabaptists right not to perform military duty approximates to the liberal position on 
religion which takes right of individual conscience to be decisive in these matters.  
Anabaptist and Quakers can perform their duties towards state in a passive way or 
provide some different service, suggests Hegel. (PR, §, 270) What else, as Avineri 
remarked, Hegel makes Jewish emancipation a criterion of whether a state is aware of 
its own universal nature or not.221 In Hegel’s words; 
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To exclude the Jews from civil rights, on the other hand, would 
rather be to confirm the isolation with which they have been 
reproached – a result for which the state refusing them rights would 
be blamable and reproachable, because by refusing, it would have 
misunderstood its own basic principle, its nature as an objective and 
powerful institution. (PR, § 270R) 
 
This point is significant because, other than Hegel’s liberal attitude towards religious 
minorities, it reflects one of the points of Hegel’s significant deviation from the actual 
politics of Prussia. It was not until 1848 that Jews in Prussia were granted civil 
emancipation and only after 1918, Jews were admitted into public service.222 
Lastly, in spite of his distaste for Catholicism, Hegel does not mention Catholics 
to be excluded. Locke’s vision of toleration on the other hand excludes Catholics.  First 
because, they are bound to a foreign prince and second, they do not recognize 
toleration as a principle.223 However, both Hegel and Locke exclude atheists from their 
state. Locke excludes atheists because they can not be moral in his mind. Hegel’s 
position on atheism is not clear, but not neutral either. Indeed, this is implicit in his 
claim that state should ask from citizens only to belong to a church, which he thinks as 
to be an advantage for the unity of state. Another comment put forwards that religion 
may be necessary within the state for uneducated population who can not rise to the 
level of philosophy. Genuine religion can provide an easier access for the truth and 
create an ethical disposition.224  
To conclude, Hegel distinguishes church and religion. First, religion is a moment 
in absolute spirit, and absolute spirit is higher than objective spirit. Secondly, in Hegel’s 
dialectic higher moments ground the previous ones. (For exp; state is the ground of civil 
society) Therefore religion grounds the state and appears higher than state. However, 
although both have the same content, practical religion in the form of feeling and 
representative knowledge is subordinate to the rational form of state. Religion in the 
form of feeling can bring alienation or/and fanaticism. State can not depend on this form 
of feeling thus can not take religion to be its higher authority. Religion and state differs 
in that sense. Their different forms are to be institutionalized; there should be a 
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separation between church and state. Otherwise, state will come close to oriental 
despotism. State should promote liberty of conscience within the limits that not let 
religion to appear as the monopoly of mind. Secondly state should treat churches 
equally. Except the neutrality criteria, Hegel’s formula of relation between church and 
state satisfies the institutional requirements proposed by Audi which are to be accepted 
in a liberal polity.225  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
Firstly, the main concern of this study was to analyze the complex relation of state 
and religion in Hegel’s thought. The scope of the study have been tried to be kept 
comprehensive by including Hegel’s early manuscripts on religion. A comparative 
approach has been adopted in the analysis of Hegel’s early and more mature works. It 
has been argued that Hegel in both his early manuscripts and later writings has always 
supported the separation of religion and state at institutional level. Indeed early Hegel 
draws a sharp line between legality and religion in terms of their distinctive purposes. 
Moreover in his early writings, Hegel establishes a negative relation between religion 
and state and, conceives them as opposites of each other. The principle of Christian 
religion has been taken as freedom either in the form of moral autonomy or in the spirit 
of reconciliation. State on the other hand, has been defined primarily as a coercive 
institution based on force. This opposition between religion and state has been identified 
as one of the sources of alienation by Hegel. Indeed, Christianity as the religion of 
freedom in its early inception, not being able to integrate itself to political legal 
structure of hostile Roman Empire, concentrated on the Beyond Kingdom of God and 
became a source of alienation. The history of Christianity presented by early Hegel is 
characterized by degeneration and loss of liberation potential. Late Hegel but sees this 
loss of freedom as a necessary moment in the progress of consciousness of freedom. It 
has been suggested that Hegel provided a secular solution for Christian alienation in his 
mature period. Indeed, late Hegel defines the principle of modern state to be based on 
subjective freedom which has its origin in Christianity. This thesis proposes that the 
main difference between early and late Hegel is to be found in their distinct conceptions 
of state. In his late writings both modern state and religion is based on freedom and thus 
there is no opposition between state and religion anymore. Late Hegel by propelling that 
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modern state is based on Christian principle of freedom; implies that the real salvation 
is in this actual world and consists in participation in the institutions of Ethical Life.  
Secondly it has been argued that Hegel’s assertion of unity of religion and state in 
his late Berlin years should not be understood as a political principle. It has been 
attempted to show that this assertion of Hegel does in no way entail establishment of 
theocratic form of polity or state religion. Hegel parallel to his earlier position affirms 
the separation of religion and state at institutional level as an indispensible part of free 
polity. Indeed, state and religion have the same content but their forms of expressing 
this content are distinct. Religion appears in the form of feeling and representation, 
whereas modern state has a rational form. Religion in the form of feeling can easily be 
transformed into a type of fanaticism and become fatal for the institutions of Ethical 
Life. On the other hand, religion can also declare the world of politics and state affairs 
as inherently evil, incapable of becoming moral and dictate retreat from world affairs. 
This will bring alienation as mentioned before. Hegel considering these risks, proposes 
that state should not let religion to establish an authority above it. Yet, state should 
provide religious liberty within certain limits. Furthermore church by having property of 
its own and people in its service falls under the jurisdiction of state.  But on the internal 
matters of doctrine, state can not interfere with religion.  
 Moreover, Hegel’s toleration towards religion minorities of Anabaptists, Quakers 
and Jews has been discussed in the present work. In his recognition of Anabaptists’ and 
Quakers rejection to perform their military duty as acceptable, Hegel’s closeness to 
liberal position which takes conscience to be decisive on these matters, have been 
highlighted. This point is critical since it constitutes a challenge for militarist charges 
against Hegel. What else, making the Jewish emancipation the criteria whether the state 
understands its real principle or not is a further challenge against the interpretations of 
Hegel’s philosophy which tend to associate him with 20th century fascism. Further, it 
has been asserted that except the neutrality criteria, Hegel’s state satisfies all the 
institutional requirements of separation of church and state which has been posited by 
Robert Audi as neutrality, equality and liberty. Indeed, Hegel’s state satisfies liberty 
principle by not interfering in the internal affairs of church and by making the practice 
of and belief in a religion a matter of individual conscience. Second, Hegel’s state does 
not prefer one religion over other but have an equal distance to all, in spite of his 
personal and theoretical commitment to Protestantism and distaste for Catholicism. 
Third, this thesis remarks that by having the requirement of belonging to a church, 
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Hegel’s state prefers religion over non religion and thus fails to satisfy neutrality 
criteria. 
 Thirdly, this thesis claims that one of the unities of religion and state found in 
Hegel’s philosophy is at the historical level. Indeed, Hegel sees history as the realization 
of Christian principle of subjective freedom, the excess point of which is the emergence 
of the idea of modern state, founded on freedom. Standard sociological interpretation 
reads history but just in the opposite way. In fact, secularization is described in terms of 
the growing division of labor which bring fragmentation of society into various spheres 
and institutions that no single idea or principle could unite all these institutions, people 
and ideas together anymore. Religious principles and values are distinguished from 
political ones and politics began to define its own immanent principles and values and 
acquire its own autonomous sphere of action.226 Whereas in Hegel’s thought; 
secularization, contrary to conventional sense of the phenomenon, appears as a process 
towards more Christianization. According to Hegel there is one principle directing the 
history and that is freedom. Freedom first emerges in Christianity and after a long 
process became the basis of modern state. Hegel’s institutions of modern society; 
bourgeois family, civil society and constitutional monarchy have their essence in this 
freedom and in that sense alone, they are also sacred institutions; expressing the real 
principle of Christianity. Moreover, the protestant reformation is key to modern 
secularism. Luther tied the personal salvation to scripture and faith and repudiated 
church authority and good works as means for salvation.227 Hegel appreciates protestant 
reformation as a world historical event but highlights its different aspects. For Hegel the 
real contribution of Luther lies in divinization of marriage against chastity, work against 
poverty and free allegiance to state against obedience to church authority.  
Conventionally conceived as secular, the modern institutions of Ethical Life are taken as 
sacred by Hegel. At this point, it is possible to observe clearly the working of Hegel’s 
dialectic. Indeed, the dichotomies of secular / sacred, Christianization / secularization 
are collapsed into higher level unities and reconceived as identical in their difference. 
Further dialectical possibility of reconciliation appears if the etymological origin of the 
term secularism is considered. In fact, the term secular derives from the Latin saeculum 
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which means of this age and of this time, denoting a spatio-temporal reality. Absolute 
on the other means which does not change and which is beyond space and time. In 
Hegel’s philosophy but God as Absolute Spirit enters into time and space and realizes 
itself in history. This in turn establishes an identity between the antithesis of saeculum 
and Absolute.  
Fourthly, it has been argued that Hegel posits a unity of religion and state at 
metaphysical level. For Hegel, both religion and state have the same content of eternal 
truth and the same principle of freedom in their essence. Religion for Hegel is the 
knowledge of god and man in God. State on the other hand is the march of God on earth 
(PR, § 258A) Both have freedom and God (which is truth) in their content but their 
form of expressing this content is different. State has a rational form whereas religion 
takes the form of pictorial thinking. But pictorial form that religion takes, does not grab 
from it its true content.  As Carl Butler has suggested, speculative philosophy of Hegel 
preserves faith and raises it to the level of knowledge. 228 For Hegel, religion can find 
confirmation in philosophy and survive the critic of philosophes.  Reason and faith can 
be reconciled in Hegel and this is one of the central projects of his speculative 
philosophy that constitutes an aspect of it which runs counter to the spirit of 
Enlightenment, according to Robert Stern.229 Indeed, according to Peter Gay the aim of 
enlightenment was absolute rejection of religious interpretation of life. For French 
philosophes, there was a life-death struggle between two irreconcilable patterns of life, 
thought and feeling; a struggle of scientific criticism against religious superstition, 
reason against unreason and anthropological view of life against a theological one. 
Moreover, the radicalization of religious beliefs by three generations of French 
philosophes is a reflection of a historical process leading away from Christianity to 
modernity for Gay. This process starts from Christian skepticism of Bayle, extends to 
the deism of Voltaire and English moral philosophers and finally culminates in atheism 
and materialism of Hume, Gibbon and Holbach.230 However, as Laurence Dickey 
remarks this characterization of Enlightenment applies only to French philosophes. 
                                               
228 Ibid. p. 152 
 
229 Robert Stern, General Introduction in G. W. F. Hegel. Critical Assessments. (ed) 
Robert Stern. Volume I (Routledge: London, New York, 1993), p. 2 
 
 
230  in Laurence Dickey, Hegel. Religion, Economics, and the Politics of Spirit 
(Cambridge University Pres: Cambridge, New York, 1987), pp. 17 - 18 
 
 72 
Aufklärung ; the German version of enlightenment, on the other hand did not embark 
anything like struggle against Christianity  Their attempt was to integrate Protestantism 
with rationalistic humanism. This however, does not mean that Aufklärer did not 
engage in criticism against Christianity; i. e. Lutheran Orthodoxy. But the alternatives 
they offered were still Christian, says Dickey. Instead of a transcendent God, they 
offered a conception of God who was immanent to world and against the grace of god 
they posited a salvation process that requires civic participation.231  Therefore, it can be 
argued that German version of Enlightenment was not a struggle against Christianity 
but a project of reconciliation modern interpretation of life with a Christian one. Hegel 
contributed to this project in his attempt of reconciling antitheses of faith/reason, 
secular/Christian. Yet, one of the most important contributions of Hegel, this thesis 
suggests to be lying in his tolerating multiple expression of the same truth.  This is what 
Hegel can still offer to us in our era characterized by multiple expressive mediums but 
which can hardly offer a common ground that can constitute a basis for dialogue 
between these forms of expression..  In the absence of such a common ground, the 
different expressions and interpretations of life can easily be considered as sharing 
nothing in common. Indeed as Gehrig have observed; 
 … Sophisticated systems of legitimation arise in cases where “interpretations of 
reality” are disputed by alternative meaning systems. The separation of church 
and state, gods and government, creates intense competition between religious and 
political systems. Modern pluralistic societies, in fact, have to deal not only with 
the “erosion of traditional meaning systems,” but with different sources of 
competition: the competition of religious and political institutions, and the 
competition of different religious systems of legitimation.232  
 
Hegel but establishes an identity between secular and religious meaning systems 
by simply claiming that both are true. Moreover Hegel also views all religions to have 
truth in their content. This study limits itself by concentrating largely on Hegel’s 
understanding of Christianity, but any future study can analyze Hegel’s ideas on other 
religions and investigate the implications of his proposed unity among all religions.  
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